Jesuit-Krauss-McCormick Library
BR110 .B783
Bovet, Pierre, 1878-1944. MAIN
The child's religion; a study of the dev
3 9967 00087 2742

ACCESSION NUMBER 60607

SHELF NUMBER BR110 B783

The Virginia Library

McCormick Theological Seminary

of the

Presbyterian Church, Chicago

826 Belden Avenue

From

Received Sept. 1929

THE CHILD'S RELIGION

THE CHILD'S RELIGION

A Study of the Development of the Religious Sentiment

BY

PIERRE BOVET

AUTHOR OF "THE FIGHTING INSTINCT," ETC.
DIRECTEUR DE L'INSTITUT JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU
PROFESSEUR À L'UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE

Authorized Translation of "Le Sentiment Religieux"

BY

GEORGE H. GREEN, M.A., PH.D., B.Sc.

AUTHOR OF "PSYCHANALYSIS IN THE CLASSROOM," "THE DAYDREAM," "THE TERROR DREAM," ETC.

PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY LIBRARY, CHICAGO

LONDON & TORONTO
J. M. DENT & SONS, LTD.
1928

All Rights Reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

M. PIERRE BOVET, Professor of Education in the University of Geneva and Director of the Institut J.-J. Rousseau, is directly known to readers in English-speaking countries by J. Y. T. Greig's translation of "L'Instinct Combatif" [1] and indirectly through the preface by Dr. Adolphe Ferrière to the book, "A New School in Belgium." [2] The former of the two books shows very clearly the type of enquiry which Professor Bovet has made peculiarly his own, in his efforts to base his pedagogy upon secure foundations: the latter, the kind of work that is being carried out in Europe as a direct result of his inspiration.

The Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute is, in the widest and best sense of the term, a school of education. It bases its work upon the principle laid down by Rousseau that all child education must be founded upon true knowledge of child nature and development. Hence a very large number of the investigations made in con-

[1] *The Fighting Instinct*, by Pierre Bovet, translated by J. Y. T. Greig, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1923.
[2] *A New School in Belgium*, by A. Faria de Vasconçellos, London, George Harrap, 1919.

nection with the Institute are undertaken with the view of gaining first-hand knowledge of the facts connected with the nature and development of children. "L'Instinct Combatif" deals with an enquiry into the reasons why children fight, the ways in which differences develop into combats, and the influence of such combats upon the children who take part in them. The present work deals with the development of religious tendencies in children. These are two works included in the famous *Collection d'actualites pedagogiques,* all of which are first-hand studies of facts about children and education, emanating from the Institute and published under its direction.

The preparation and publication of such a collection would alone justify the existence of the Institute, and demonstrate the value of its services to education. The teacher or parent, acquainted with no more than one of these volumes, would learn that the activities of children, at home and in school, are material of far greater value than the opinions about children recorded in books. He would realise, what Professor Bovet attempts to teach, that the home and the classroom are pedagogical laboratories, in which systematic observation may be carried on with the object of building up a science of education. We are content, in general, to regard material

of real value as nothing more than matter for amusing stories about children or as something that interferes with our work in the classroom. And this is because, on the whole, our training colleges and the training departments of our universities aim at training craftsmen, whilst the J.-J. Rousseau Institute aims at the training of scientific educationists. The two aims are complementary, and not antagonistic: neither can be ignored by any institution which aspires to train teachers.

Bovet himself sees very clearly, as the later chapters of this book amply demonstrate, that the work of an educational institute must go considerably beyond the facts of child life. A pure science would be content to collect such facts in an orderly and systematic way, to frame hypotheses in accordance with them, and rigorously to test the hypotheses. Education, however, is not a pure science, but one developed with a definite goal in view: the securing of a sound practice. We wish to know the facts of child nature and development so that our practice shall be in accordance with that development and shall not be contrary to the child's nature; but the goal at which we aim is decided for us by considerations arising outside our enquiries into the psychology of the child. We are compelled to enquire into the social, moral

and religious life of mankind, and our enquiries pass from the sphere of experimental psychology to sociology, anthropology, the study of religious experience, ethics and philosophy. "Le Sentiment Religieux" shows very clearly how an enquiry, directed in the first instance to the thoughts and activities of children in relation to religion, broadens into an enquiry into the religious experience of adults, and ultimately becomes an attempt to formulate general principles and actual procedures in connection with religious education.

A great part of this work is scientific in the strictest sense of the word; dealing with verifiable facts and with direct inferences from them. Other parts are, perhaps, less certain, inasmuch as expressions of personal opinion and personal judgments of value inevitably enter. Here, as in places where Professor Bovet is frankly speculative, the reader may find himself at variance with the author, and will do well to discover how far his lack of agreement is due to a weakness in the argument, and how far to the unwitting operation of prejudices of his own.

But however much he may differ from the author, no reader will doubt Professor Bovet's complete sincerity, or fail to feel that here is an enquiry well worth the making. Religious

education is lifted out of the sphere of bickering and prejudice, and an attempt is modestly and sincerely made to discover through patient observation exactly what are its essentials. Professor Bovet is not sufficiently non-human or super-human to escape prejudice entirely, but it will be generally admitted that prejudice has had very little share in shaping the conclusions at which he arrives. No one realises more clearly than he that his book is not the last word on the subject. The English version has been prepared because the translator feels that the work might well be an inspiration, stimulating further enquiry into a topic whose intensity of interest for men and women we may gauge from the strength and bitterness of the conflicts waged regarding it.

The appendix dealing with "respect," which Professor Bovet treats strictly in relation to his general theme, may be specially commended to the student of education. The charge is often made, specifically or in general terms, that modern methods of education, based on child psychology, fail to give children proper reverence and respect for tradition, or for people and things widely regarded as proper objects of respect and reverence. It is still widely believed that respect and reverence must be taught through

compulsion. The author makes definite suggestions, based upon his own studies of the historical development of individuals; and a careful study of the evidence he adduces can hardly fail to show where educational methods are frequently at fault, or to inspire teachers and parents to develop more fruitful modes of procedure.

Such a result as this is precisely what Professor Bovet seeks to achieve. He is one of the least dogmatic of men, and would be the last to consider any one of his own conclusions as final, or any one of his suggestions as infallible or capable of universal application. He attempts to use the facts of child life and behaviour to throw light on perplexing problems, and to enable us to understand what has hitherto seemed baffling and meaningless. He realises that those who become aware of the facts about children will not rest content with the mere addition to their knowledge, but that with the changed outlook will come the desire for improvement in method. It is because of this that the books which steadily flow from the Institut J.-J. Rousseau are inspiring and stimulating, in the very best sense of these terms, the teachers of Europe and America; and it is with the hope of introducing a work of Professor Bovet, to which he himself attaches great importance, to

teachers and parents who read English more easily than they read the original French that this translation of "Le Sentiment Religieux" has been undertaken and carried out under the author's supervision.

GEORGE H. GREEN.

December, 1927

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	Translator's Preface	vii
I.	The Religious Sentiment	3
II.	Love	13
III.	The First Adoration	26
IV.	The First Religious Crisis	33
V.	God and the Great Family	48
VI.	God in the World	59
VII.	Towards God the Spirit	86
VIII.	Pedagogical Comments	110
IX.	Conclusion—Psychology and Theology	121
	Respect: An Essay in Moral Psychology	131
	Spiritual Unity: A Psychological Study	163
	The Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute and Its Work	191
	Index	201

THE CHILD'S RELIGION

PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY LIBRARY,
CHICAGO

THE CHILD'S RELIGION

CHAPTER I

THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

"THE religious sentiment" is by no means a new term.[1] But the various ways in which it is employed in current usage and our incapacity to substitute for it a single word of definite meaning, together with the discredit into which such words as *faith, devotion* and *piety,* common enough in the speech of our fathers, have fallen, appear to testify to the difficulty we experience when we endeavour to state with precision the essentials of the facts of religion and when we attempt to consider them subjectively.

We know the differences which have arisen over discussions of the definition of religion. The confusion is partly due to the fact that history, sociology and psychology approach the question by different routes. But, even if we

[1] Littré, when dealing with the word "religieux," quotes a phrase from Madame de Stael's Corinne: "The religious sentiment unites men intimately, whilst self-pride and fanaticism makes them objects of jealousy and hate."

regard religion from the psychological aspect of "religious experience" only, and further voluntarily confine our outlook to the religious experience of our own contemporaries in countries whose civilisation is Christian in character, we find it impossible to deny that the varieties of religious experience are extremely numerous, or that the "religious sentiment" is diversely coloured by markedly different affective states.

William James, in the admirable study which is above all descriptive, deliberately renounces the attempt to define the religious sentiment. He discovers excellent reasons for asserting that such definition is impossible: there is no specific religious sentiment. Some of the expressions he employs lead us to believe that there are not, for him, any objects which are specifically religious:

> "Consider also the 'religious sentiment,' which we see referred to in so many books, as if it were a single sort of mental entity.
>
> "In the psychologies and in the philosophies of religion, we find the authors attempting to specify just what entity it is. One man allies it to the feeling of dependence; one makes it a derivative from fear; others connect it with the sexual life; others still identify it with the feeling of the infinite; and so on. Such different ways of conceiving it ought of themselves to arouse doubt as to whether it

possibly can be one specific thing; and the moment we are willing to treat the term 'religious sentiment' as a collective name for the many sentiments which religious objects may arouse in alternation, we see that it probably contains nothing whatever of a psychologically specific nature. There is religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy, and so forth. But religious love is only man's natural emotion of love directed to a religious object; religious fear is only the ordinary fear of commerce, so to speak, the common quaking of the human breast, in so far as the notion of divine retribution may arouse it; religious awe is the same organic thrill which we feel in a forest at twilight, or in a mountain gorge; only this time it comes over us at the thought of our supernatural relations; and similarly of all the various sentiments which may be called into play in the lives of religious persons. As concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling *plus* a specific sort of object, religious emotions of course are psychic entities distinguishable from other concrete emotions; but there is no ground for assuming a simple abstract 'religious emotion' to exist as a distinct elementary affection by itself, present in every religious experience without exception.

"As there seems to be no one elementary religious emotion, but only a common store-

house of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of religious object, and no one specific and essential kind of religious act." [1]

Restricted thus to definition of the vaguest kind, James calls religious "the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine;" [2] this religious object, "the divine," being in turn defined as "first things in the way of being and of power." [3] To this definition James appends a description of the religious attitude—"there must be something solemn, serious and tender about any attitude which we denominate religious." [4] *Je m'en fichisme* and blasphemous revolt are alike foreign to it.

In laying down the principles of religious psychology, Flournoy, too, renounces the attempt to define the object of the new science. He takes for granted that his readers have knowledge of what is really in question. "Religion," says he, "is an assemblage of emotional states, of sentiments and desires which have an original character of their own."

[1] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, Longmans, Green and Co., pp. 27–28.
[2] Ibid., pp. 31.
[3] Ibid., pp. 31.
[4] Ibid., pp. 38.

In short, on every occasion when someone has attempted to take into account the variety of experiences and at the same time the elementary principle of logic which demands that a definition shall include everything defined by it, we are told in vague terms of a religious sentiment, which drifts like a cloud of incense smoke about a number of well-characterised conscious states, moral, aesthetic and social. Has not religion been spoken of as a disturbance felt in presence of the infinite?

A conclusion such as this seems too much like a confession of impotence to satisfy one who seeks to understand fully the object of his study. These indefinable religious feelings ought at least to be derivable from some well-marked sentiment—something characterised by definite emotions rather than by vague disturbances. Is it not worth while to make a search for this primary sentiment? Since logical definition has proved useless and inadequate, ought we not to seek enlightenment from a genetic study?

This research runs on parallel lines to one made by Ribot. In his study of the passions, this author applied himself to the task of linking each of them—since each determines a crystallisation of the entire psychic being—to a fundamental instinct: gluttony manifests itself in connection with the instinct of nutrition, avarice

with the instinct of ownership and possession, jealousy with the sexual instinct, and so forth. In the same way we seek a primitive emotion, closely linked to primary biological activities, which will serve as a type and as a basis for the differentiated sentiments which appertain to the religious life. Our notion of the definition of a natural species will not permit us to allow its origin to remain unknown. Perhaps, from our genetic standpoint, we shall presently see light penetrating into this wholly obscure region.

It would be hardly commendable to attempt to study the religious sentiment in its racial origins or amongst primitive peoples. We may, in imagination, invoke the collective ecstasies which accompany the totemic rites which Durkheim is willing to regard as the elementary forms of religious life, but it would be extremely hazardous to attempt to travel far by this route. We possess minute descriptions of the customs and ceremonies of the Aruntas, but there is no introspection that can make known to us, even indirectly, what these people experience. Let us beware of attempting to explain the mysterious by means of the unknown.

We propose to consider the first manifestations of the religious sentiment, not in the species, but in the individual.

The religious psychology of the child has been

less studied than would be believed.[5] One point, however, appears to be well established, namely, that the great variety of religious experience which surprises us in adults is already to be discovered in children. The feeling of the sublime when in presence of the grand spectacles of nature, the mystic intuition of the presence of an invisible and beneficent being, the tragic conviction of shortcoming, are already present in the inner lives of little children; and in numbers of these experiences we are compelled to recognise with astonishment that we are dealing with original facts and that imitation plays no part whatsoever.

Faced with this wealth of varied experience, we seem at first to have gained nothing by leaving the world of adults for the world of children, since here we are baffled by precisely the same difficulties.

But let us look more closely into the matter. We are able to see, in all these diverse religious experiences of the child, a single factor which shows itself in bolder relief in the case of children than in the case of adults—the personal factor; that which constitutes the sentiments which the child has for *persons.* Without attempting to

[5] See G. Berguer, *Psychologie Religieuse.* Revue et bibliographie générales. Arch. de Psych., XIV, 1914. Special mention should be made of Clavier's "L'idée de Dieu chez l'enfant," 1913 (2nd Edn., 1926).

prove this by means of a detailed analysis, we shall indicate our meaning in a few words.

The world, for the child, manifests *someone*. As has been said a hundred times, in the mythological explanations which children invent to give an account of natural phenomena, and—what is more to our point, since the sentiment has here a larger place and we are more obviously on religious ground—to give an account of the immediate and general impression which the spectacle of the universe makes them feel, the same anthropomorphism is apparent. Nature is angry, or on the contrary is kindly and friendly, like the persons of the child's own environment.

In these experiences, which may be termed mystical, of an invisible presence, what always matters (and it is worth while to insist strongly on this point) is the presence, not of a thing, but of a person.[6] And the experience itself has, as a necessary condition, besides a doubling of consciousness, momentary at least, an affective void: the child projects from himself upon an invisible object, whose reality is attested to him through his experience, the sentiments he feels towards a loved being to whom he can no longer exhibit them.

[6] James, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff.

If our earlier analyses, published elsewhere[7] are accurate, the moral experience of sin is also conditioned by personal sentiments. In order that the child should be aware of having failed in his duty, it is necessary that someone for whom he feels admiration and respect should formerly have given him an order which must be obeyed, have laid down a law which must not be broken.

In this connection we must also recall the very special interest which children take in the heroes of Biblical and religious history. Persons, above all, hold the child's attention in the lessons given in the Sunday school.[8]

The study of the religious experiences of children leads us to seek the origins of the religious sentiment in the personal sentiments. This conclusion was arrived at independently of recent child study, and before the development of the modern scientific psyschology, which formulates hypotheses which are in entire agreement with it.

Fear and *love* have been in turn regarded as the characteristic foundation of the inner religious life and both hypotheses have still their adherents today.

[7] *Les conditions psychologiques de l'obligation de conscience.* Année psychologique XVIII. *Le mystère du devoir.* Revue de théol. et de phil., No. 3 (1913). *The Feeling of Oughtness: Its Psychological Conditions.* Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, IX, 13, 1912.

[8] Cf. Dawson, *Children's Interest in the Bible.* Ped. Sem., VII, 151 (July, 1900).

These two sentiments commend themselves, for the purpose of our enquiry, as being very strongly rooted in human nature; and as being closely associated with those primordial tendencies which are equally indispensable to the perpetuation of the race—the instinct of preservation and the instinct of reproduction. The conservation of values, in which Hoffding—whose theory is philosophical rather than biological—makes religion consist, is very directly linked to the functions which in physical life fulfill the ends of the same two instincts.

Of the two sentiments, fear and love, it is above all in the latter that psychologists have seen a connection with the religious sentiment.

CHAPTER II

LOVE

THE teaching which relates the origin of religion to love has a long history, which may with advantage be summarised here.

The first phase of this teaching is constituted by what may be called, in the strict sense of the word, the erotogenic theory of religion. In a spirit incontestably hostile to Christianity, medical men, of whom Binet-Sanglé in France and Schroeder in the United States may be regarded as characteristic representatives, applied themselves to the collocation of a great many facts showing the very important place taken in religion by rites, images and beliefs relating to generation (sacred prostitution, phallic symbols and obscene myths); concluding in consequence that sexual and religious emotions were identical.

Against this view William James directed his eloquent chapter on medical materialism. According to the author of "The Varieties of Religious Experience"—the book which marks the second phase of the history which is now

claiming our attention—there is no special relation between religion and any particular instinct. Religion concerns the entire man, who can describe his intuitions of spiritual things only in the language, originally inadequate and material, which he knows. It is possible to find in the writings of the mystics metaphors of an alimentary kind, and there are in all religious denominations repasts of a sacred character; but we do not on this account conclude that hunger and thirst are identical with the aspirations of the soul that seeks God. We make allowance for the fact that we are dealing with metaphor.

The facts pointed out by James are well described, and his protest against the depreciatory judgments of certain psychiatrists is certainly justified, but his solution of the problem is not satisfactory to us. The work of Stanley Hall marks a third phase of the discussion. Inspired by a totally different spirit from that which animated the erotogenists, Hall was led, in his great work, "Adolescence" (1905) to set out the correspondence between the evolution of individual religion and that of the sentiments and emotions relative to the other sex. The age when the soul opens itself to human love is also pre-eminently that of profound religious impressions. Between "conversion" and the

"thunderbolt" there are many analogies. We do not deprecate religion when we say that it shares with love in expanding the soul, in directing the energies till then concentrated upon egotistic interests, and in being a revelation and an initiation which snatches man from himself. If the two passions so often speak with the same language, it is more than mere chance.

The discussion of our problem enters upon a fourth phase with the advent of psychoanalysis. This part of the debate is for us connected with the name of our revered master, Flournoy. In his 1913 lectures and in his "Mystique Moderne," Flournoy has shown that the Freudian doctrine of "sublimation" of the sexual instincts re-opens the discussion of the problem. He shows that, without in the least subscribing to the teachings of the erotogenists, it is possible to admit between the sexual instinct and the religious sentiment, not an indisputable identity but an essential continuity, the latter developing from the former: resulting, that is to say, from a transformation of the same elements.

At the origin of the religious sentiment we have a primitive emotion, love, strictly associated with a fundamental tendency, the sexual instinct. The question we have proposed to ourselves may thus be answered.

In spite of the great authority of Flournoy, I must be permitted to doubt the finality of this formula. Has not Flournoy, a profoundly religious and Christian man, been carried farther than was necessary or right by his extreme generosity, his instinct for fair play, and (to use his own word of twenty-five years earlier) his desire not to "quibble" in discussing his most intimate convictions with his opponents?[1] Has he not, from the fear of appearing to be influenced by a religious bias, conceded more than the facts demanded?

Flournoy propounds the question of the relation between sexual instinct and religious experience in an entirely satisfactory manner; but the reply which he gives might with advantage, it appears to us, have been stated with greater exactness.

A famous page of Secrétan[2], to which it is always profitable to return when speaking of the sublimation of the sexual instinct in morality and religion, will help us to take a forward step. Speaking of the various senses in which the word "love" is used, Secrétan asserts that there subsists, in spite of all that distinguishes them and

[1] *Science et Foi*, in Saint-Croix, 1898. ("Picaillonner" in original.)
[2] *Le Principe de la Morale* (1883), p. 160. I have already summarised this page in my *L'Instinct Combatif*, p. 139. (Page 108 of the English translation—The Fighting Instinct.)

even places them in opposition, in the love of the sister of charity who washes the sores of the sick, something of primitive love, made up of desire and voluptuousness.

Let us attend to this point closely. The attentions of the nurse sometimes evoke the tenderness of conjugal love: more often they recall the caresses of maternal love. Is not the vocation of hospital nursing more a substitute for maternity than for marriage?

Psychologists would doubtless make light of this distinction. We know the very wide meaning which Freud and his followers have attributed to the word "sexuality": have they not declared this word to include everything designated by the German "lieben"? But we are not here dealing with the doctrines of Freud, and we do not feel ourselves bound, in spite of the admiration we feel for his work, to think only in terms of his conceptions. We ask ourselves, then, if the recognition in religious aspiration of the sublimation of love leads us to limit our outlook to conjugal love—to "genital sexuality," as Freud terms it. The relation of divine love to human love demands that we study functionally—and this is the fifth phase of the discussion of our problem—a more general problem, the interrelations of the several forms of human love.

Here, set forth in other terms, is one of the essential problems of the sexual theory of Freud.

For the French ideologists of the eighteenth century, the principal object, not to say the unique task, of psychology was to make clear how, by a gradual synthesis of his elementary sensations, man, originally a sheet of blank paper, comes to have all the ideas which he possesses, even the most abstract. To give his enterprise the necessary clarity, Condillac imagines his statue, and from this sets forth.

The psychoanalysts of today direct their efforts to a task which is the inverse of this, though symmetrical with it. Their endeavour is to show how, from a primitive but extraordinarily complex sentiment, there come into existence through progressive differentiation affective states of the most varied description. The picture which dominates their argument is not an ingenious allegory, but the sight of the appeased infant on its mother's breast, its hunger and thirst (the two are in reality one) assuaged, its need for tenderness satisfied; its happiness consisting in the satisfaction of all the instincts, between which it can no longer distinguish. At the beginning of psychic evolution the analysts place, not a multiplicity of simple sensations which leave impresses upon soft and passive wax, but the unique and complex sentiment

which one person, the child, experiences at the contact of another person, the mother.

When there is a matter of naming this undifferentiated sentiment, this cell from which is developed and organised all the affective life of man, Freud chooses for it the name of the derived instincts which, in the life of the species, will play a preponderating part, and terms it "sexuality." Suckling assumes the value of a satisfaction of the "libido," and the love of the child for the mother is regarded as incestuous.

These expressions may appear awkward and ill-chosen, but it is impossible to overlook the real merit they possess of compelling us to realise the existence of the problem presented by the facts.

If we adhere to the terms which ordinary common sense approves and see in the confused sentiment of the nursling the rudiments of filial love rather than those of genital sexuality, we are not thereby barred from asserting that the experiences of the very young infant are manifestly revived in conjugal sentiments. There are women who are loved as mothers by their husbands, who find their breasts havens of childish comfort. It is not necessary to say more, for is not this trait common to all lovers? Is there not, in all love, some revival of filial love?

And, if there are maternal wives, is it not

equally certain that enamoured mothers (mothers in love with their own children) are not lacking.[3]

Thus, three kinds of love—filial, conjugal and maternal—present themselves in a synthesis in which they are more closely united than are the members of a trilogy or a triptych. Thought is able to distinguish them as far as it is able to regard their objects and their functioning, but life presents them to us intimately joined together, both in their organic resonances and their psychological components.

Nothing, meanwhile, forbids us to enquire which of these forms of love is nearest to religious love.

The experiences of the mystics have, in these later times, led psychologists to confine their attention too closely to analogies between the religious sentiment and conjugal love. Meanwhile, language itself suffices to bring to light facts of another order. It is not by chance that we speak of *filial piety,* and that in Latin the words *pius* and *pietas* indicate at the same time the religious sentiment a man has for his parents and the filial sentiment he has for the gods.[4]

[3] I take advantage of this opportunity to mention that very fine posthumous work of Madame de Maday-Hentzelt, *L'Amour Maternel* (1912). In it is to be found a very advanced analysis of the maternal instinct.

[4] It is not without significance that the same Latin word gives rise to the word *pity,* the name of the sentiment which to us appears to be the sublimation of maternal love.

May not the religious sentiment be originally filial love? In the most characteristic manifestation of this love, veneration or respect, we discern a double origin—a tender love and an admiring fear: the same sources, as we have just seen, as those of religion.[5]

This fact is of itself very striking. Let us hasten to add to it others which show in an illuminating manner the relations which exist between filial love and the religious sentiment.

Many autobiographers have told us the nature of the relation which exists between the sentiments they feel towards their parents and their religious sentiments:

> "I was about twelve years of age," writes St. Teresa, "when my mother died, and I, realising the loss I had sustained, threw myself with tears streaming from my eyes at the foot of the image of the Holy Virgin and begged her to be my mother." [6]

The inverse of this is shown in the following passage, with which Ruskin ends his account of his own education:

> "I had nothing to love.
>
> "My parents were—in a sort—visible powers of nature to me, no more loved than

[5] See Appendix.

[6] *Vie de sainte Thérèse,* Chap. I. Cf. Stanley Hall, *The Moral and Religious Training of Children.* Pedagogical Seminary, I, 2 (1891).

the sun and the moon: only I should have been annoyed and puzzled if either of them had gone out; (how much, now, when both are darkened!)—still less did I love God; not that I had any quarrel with Him, or fear of Him; but simply found what people told me was His service, disagreeable; and what people told me was His book, not entertaining." [7]

Every observer has asserted the existence, in the attitude of the child towards his parents, of a number of traits which agree at all points with those which humanity manifests in its relations with the gods. Thus a very shrewd observer has said: "The child feels compelled to make an unreserved avowal to someone of the fulness of his admiration." [8]

This is the place to quote the passage, a fine one in spite of many redundances, with which Pestalozzi concludes his letters to Gertrude:

"I do not want to bring these letters to an end without touching on the question which is really the keystone of my whole system. What relation is there between religion (*Gottesfurcht*) and the principles relating to the general development of man, whose truth I

[7] Ruskin, *Praeterita* (George Allen—1905). Vol. I, p. 52, para. 50.

[8] The late Madame Pieczynska, in the unedited notes on the religious education of the child which she has been kind enough to place at my disposal, together with a valuable questionnaire and a number of replies she has received.

have shown? I seek in myself the solution of this problem, asking myself how the idea of God originated in my own soul.[9] How comes it that I believe in a God, into whose arms I throw myself, feeling myself happy when I love Him, when I trust Him, when I give thanks to Him, when I follow in His steps?

"I am not slow to see that the sentiments of love, of trust, of gratitude and of obedience must be developed in me before I am able to turn them towards God. It is necessary that I should love men, that I should trust them, that I should thank them, that I should obey them, before I can raise myself to the level of a similar attitude towards God: for 'if a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how then shall he love God whom he hath not seen?' I ask myself then how I come to have for men love, trust, gratitude and obedience; in what way there enters into my nature those sentiments whose essential factors are love, gratitude and trust towards men and the performance of acts of obedience. And I discover that these have as their starting-point the relations which exist between a little child and its mother. It is necessary that the mother should care for her child, should nurse him, should ensure his safety and should make

[9] What is here meant is not the abstract idea of God, but the representation and the comprehension of the intimate nature of God which lead us to faith, love, trust and beatitude. How do I come to conceive God? (Pestalozzi's own note.)

him happy. She cannot do otherwise. She is forced to act in this way by an instinct entirely sensual.[10] She does so, she satisfies the child's needs, she removes from contact with him those things which are unpleasant, she comes to the aid of his impotence. The child is cared for: he is made happy. The germ of love begins to develop within him.

"But now before his eyes appears something he has never before seen. He is astounded, he is afraid, he weeps. The mother holds him firmly against her breast, she plays with him and distracts him. His tears are stayed. But his eyes remain moist for some time further. The object reappears. The mother again takes the child into her arms and smiles anew at him. Now he no longer weeps, but responds to the smile of his mother with a look of unclouded happiness. The germ of trust begins to develop within him.

"On the occasions of his several needs the mother busies herself about his cradle. She is there when he is hungry. When he hears her step, he is thrilled. When he sees her, he holds out his hand. Once at her breast, the child is reassured, and his expression brightens. His mother and the person who completely satisfies him are thought of by him as one and the same, and he feels gratitude.

[10] By the sensual (*sinnlich*) instinct, the maternal sentiment is here implied (Pestalozzi's note).

"The germs of love, of trust and of gratitude are not slow in developing. . . ." [11]

Brotherly love, obedience—all the sentiments and all the acts which, for Pestalozzi, constitute the "comprehension of the nature of God" develop in the first instance at the mother's knee.

Father Girard had perhaps these pages of Pestalozzi in mind when he wrote:

"Is religion anything other than filial piety, which, linked in the first instance to a visible mother and father, soars later towards the heavens—even to the invisible Father of the human family?" [12]

Although it is from the study of the child that we shall seek confirmation of this hypothesis, the history of religion also gives evidence, we believe, of the considerable place taken in cults of the most diverse types by the filial sentiment. The ancestral totem and the "All-Father" of the Australian primitives, the Earth-Mother of the agrarian cults, ancestor worship in Confucianism, the hearth of the ancient city, the "God of your fathers" of Judaism, and finally the Christian faith in its inexhaustible moral richness—"Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect": all make their appeal to a prolongation and an extension of the filial sentiment.

[11] How Gertrude Teaches Her Children, Chapter XIII.
[12] *De l'enseignement regulier de la langue maternelle.* 1re partie, Ch. I.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ADORATION

We are accustomed to say that children "adore" their parents. Possibly, however, this adoration has in the past been too exclusively considered as a sentiment, involving, it is true, certain consequences as regards attitude and conduct, but without sufficient insistence upon the intellectual aspects of this attitude and the repercussions of the sentiment in the domain of thought.

When we endeavour to formulate the child's ideas of his father and mother, we find them to include the divine attributes of classical theology: omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.

Describing the attitude of a child of two and a half years of age, one of Madame Pieczynska's correspondents expresses herself in the following terms:

> "The child looks for everything in his mother; taking for granted that she can do everything she wishes, that she knows every-

thing that happens, that she is not only perfect, but incapable of being otherwise. Each act of the child is only a consequence of these convictions."

Speaking of a less tender age, of the period of his childhood which extended up to the age of twelve, Gratry says, in his *Souvenirs,* the same thing:

"I was already prepared for God by natural religion, by the cult of His visible representatives, my father and my mother. . . . My father and my mother had often appeared to me to be two impeccable angels, knowing all and all-powerful. Truly they represented God to me, and I loved God in them." [1]

Of the members of this trinity of perfections —omniscience, omnipotence and all-goodness— which the child spontaneously attributes to his parents, it is difficult to say to which the first place should be assigned. Influenced by our own adult speculations or by Pascal's hierarchy of three orders, we might perhaps be tempted to arrange them in a series which would take admiration for power as the child's starting-point and would lead him finally to the exaltation of goodness.

One of my correspondents asserts that he is able to remember the change in the character

[1] p. 7.

of the perfection which he attributed to his father. He began by considering him the most powerful of men: later he thought him the wisest.

But it is difficult to admit that the belief in the perfect goodness of his parents is the final goal in the evolution of the child's soul, since, of the three intellectual transcripts of the single sentiment, it is "perfect goodness" which is most highly charged with emotional value.

"Perfect goodness" is, in any case, the one attribute which endures longest against the evidence of facts: the little boy and the little girl will seek, through the passing years, to preserve all of it that they are able . . . something, at least.

> "Until her tenth year," I read in one of the documents placed at my disposal, "she is convinced that her mother is as good as God is: and for a still longer period that she is nearly as good as He."

Is it not legitimate to believe that the most tenacious ideas are also the oldest? If psychology had not so much to fear from a return to the methods of scholasticism, it would not be difficult to show how the belief (fundamental, by hypothesis) in all-goodness implies naturally belief in omnipotence, as this in turn implies belief in omniscience.

But let us carefully guard against deductions of this kind: the implicit affirmations of the child precede the age of logical reasoning, and owe nothing to it. This is proved by the fact that these affirmations are indifferent to even the exigencies of space and time. In childish theology, by which I mean the attributes with which the child endows his parents, we find the equivalents of the classic dogmas of omnipresence and of eternity.

It is perhaps difficult to prove that there is a stage in the child's life when he positively thinks that his parents are present everywhere, but we must recognise that there is, to the childish mind at least, no logical absurdity in holding at the same time beliefs which are contradictory.

"When I was little (four years, or perhaps three and a half years old)," a correspondent writes to me, "we lived in a two-storied house where my father had a workshop on the first floor, separated from the rest of the house by padded doors—as might be imagined, with seven children. I was a stubborn child, and submitted with very bad grace to the authority of one of my sisters who was entrusted with the charge of my education at table. When once we were embarked on a dispute, it used to go on interminably or end badly. One day my father cut short an altercation at the be-

ginning: 'Listen,' he said to me. 'Go to my room, enter without knocking, go to the big armchair and see if I am there. If not, look under the table, and then come back and tell me.' I had some trouble in getting down from my high chair and climbing two stories, but I did not for a second think of hesitating. It took some time, but I ended up by returning to the dining-room and saying gravely to my father: 'No, you were not there.' Then, seeing that all the family were laughing, I cried in consternation: 'You have told me something silly!' From that day the charm was broken and my father was relegated to the rank of a common mortal. But for a long time I still pictured God to myself with a white beard and blue eyes."

Just as parents are freed from the laws of space, so they are not bound by those of time.

"I was little more than three years of age," writes Loti, "and my mother about forty-two. But I had not the least notion of my mother's age: it never occurred to me to ask if she were young or old. . . . No, at that time, she was SHE, a being altogether unique, whom I did not dream of comparing to anyone else, from whom radiated joy, security and tenderness, from whom emanated everything that was good, through whom I understood dawning faith and prayer." [2]

[2] Loti, *Le roman d'un enfant*, p. 21.

To Loti, also, we owe this declaration:

"My mother is the only person in the world about whom I have not experienced the feeling that death will separate us for ever."

Not subject to time, immortal—eternal, we are tempted to say. For children, their mother and father have always existed:

"I remember well that I was seized with indignation when I heard a friend of the family say in conversation that he was older than my father. 'That is not true! My father is older. Nobody is older than my father.' (He was then about sixty years of age.)

"I told this story to a friend who assured me that he could recall very clearly having experienced the same feeling about his own father."

Ubiquity in space and time serves naturally to support omniscience. But do not let us see logical relations between these affirmations. The child's world of ideas is pre-logical: in it thought is sustained and animated by feeling.

It may be asked whether the perfections which we have just reviewed are attributed by the child to his parents only. Are not all "grown-ups" likewise regarded as omniscient and omnipotent? Have we therefore the right to affirm a relation between the filial sentiment and this

primal theology of the child? Is it not merely the attitude of Gulliver towards Brobdingnag? There is justice in the objection. Nothing is more alien to our purpose than the attempt to explain by the "call of the blood" the facts we are pointing out. But his father and his mother are the first "good giants" the child meets, and if other giants share in measure in their perfections, it is clear that we must regard this as the effect of an extension of the feelings inspired in the child by his immediate entourage. The knowledge and the power that the child gives to "grown-ups" are in origin the paternal omniscience and omnipotence. The study of the crisis through which the child will pass will convince us fully on this point.

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST RELIGIOUS CRISIS

DAILY experience proves the perfections which the child attributes to his parents to be illusory, and, consequently, the appearance of a crisis is inevitable. In intensity this crisis varies in different individuals; presenting sometimes the dramatic characteristics of "Jouffroy's night," [1] and at other times proceeding by way of a slow disillusion.

The occasions of the crisis, as we might expect, vary. We quote two accounts of childish crises that are abrupt. In the first, the child's world of ideas is shattered because the parental omniscience has been found wanting. In the second, the parental omnipotence was found to be at fault.

"In the course of this, my sixth year, there happened a series of minute and soundless incidents which, elementary as they may seem when told, were second in real importance to none in my mental history. . . .

" . . . My Mother always deferred to my

[1] James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 176.

Father, and in his absence spoke of him to me, as if he were all-wise. I confused him in some sense with God; at all events I believed that my Father knew everything and saw everything. One morning in my sixth year, my Mother and I were alone in the morning-room, when my Father came in and announced some fact to us. I was standing on the rug, gazing at him, and when he made this statement, I remember turning quickly, in embarrassment, and looking into the fire. The shock to me was as that of a thunderbolt, for what my Father had said *was not true.* My Mother and I, who had been present at the trifling incident, were aware that it had not happened exactly as it had been reported to him. My Mother gently told him so, and he accepted the correction. Nothing could possibly have been more trifling to my parents, but to me it meant an epoch. Here was the appalling discovery, never suspected before, that my Father was not as God, and did not know everything. The shock was not caused by any suspicion that he was not telling the truth, as it appeared to him, but by the awful proof that he was not, as I had supposed, omniscient." [2]

Another incident went to confirm this impression and even to aggravate it:

[2] Edmund Gosse, Father and Son: a Study of Two Temperaments (London, William Heinemann, 1909), pp. 33–34.

"The theory that my Father was omniscient or infallible was now dead and buried. He probably knew very little; in this case he had not known a fact of such importance that if you did not know that, it could hardly matter what you knew. My Father, as a deity, as a natural force of immense prestige, fell in my eyes to a human level. In future, his statements about things in general need not be accepted implicitly." [3]

Here is the second narrative.

The little Hebbel became a pupil, at the age of four, in a school kept by an elderly lady.

"It was there, I remember, that I received the first terrible impression of Nature and of something invisible beyond her. The child has in his life a period—rather a long one—during which he believes that the whole world depends on his parents, or at least upon his father. And so he asks his parents for fine weather just as he might ask for a toy. This period comes to an end when the child one day discovers, to his great surprise, that some events are as unwelcome to his parents as they are to himself. With the ending of this period there vanishes a great part of the mystic charm which gathered about the sacred head of the father. It is at this same moment that a man's true independence begins.

[3] Ibid, p. 36.

"My own eyes were opened to this fact by a terrible storm, accompanied by a thunder-clap and a flash of lightning." (We omit the dramatic account of the storm.) "The maid, as frightened as the tiniest of the children, stood erect, crying, 'God is angry!' Then she added, didactically, 'It is because you are such bad children!' This cry, though it issued from a humble source, forced me to look beyond myself and those about me: it kindled in me the spark of religion.

"Returning from the school to my home, I found there desolation: our pear-tree had not only lost its fruit, but all its leaves. A superb plum-tree, which sheltered a number of younger trees like a great foster mother, had been deprived of its finest branches, and seemed mutilated and crippled. . . . And now I suddenly understood why my father went to church every Sunday, and why I must never put on a clean shirt without saying, 'God bless it!' I had learned to know the Lord of lords: His wrathful servants, the thunder and the lightning, the hail and the tempest, had opened wide the gates of my heart, and He had entered in in all His majesty.

"What had happened to me may be briefly stated. One night when the wind whistled loudly in the chimney and the rain beat vigorously on the roof, at the moment when I

was being put to bed the petition learned by rote and said with the lips only was transformed abruptly into a really anxious prayer. Thus was broken the spiritual bond which till then had linked me exclusively to my parents. And very soon I came to make complaints to God about my parents even, when I considered that they had behaved unjustly towards me." [4]

In addition to these dramatic narratives, many shorter accounts might be given:

A doctor remembers distinctly how, at about the age of seven, he felt a persistent need to put to the proof the omniscience of his father by asking for information on the greatest variety of subjects.

When the child asked for an explanation of the working of a steam-engine, the father acquitted himself fairly well, but when his questioner went on to ask for an account of the way in which a trumpet worked, the result was less brilliant. The fact that he could "stump" his father by puzzles of his own propounding made a very deep impression on the child.

Some years back, a small boy of six paid me a visit in the country. I cut out a basket for him from a fresh chestnut, and the making of the object fascinated him. When he bade me good-bye, I asked him if he did not want

[4] Hebbel, quoted by Roetgger, *Kind und Gottesidee* (Berlin, 1908).

to take the chestnut I had cut out for him as well as those with which he had stuffed his pockets. He replied, 'No. I want to see if my father knows how to make one.' In order that the test should be a real one, it was evidently necessary that the father should not be permitted to see the model!

In the many questions which children ask at this age, it is necessary, we believe, to recognise in addition to the "desire to know," the "desire to know what the grown-ups know."

For some time it has been asserted that children pass through a rationalistic and philosophical stage of development at about the sixth year. Certainly there is in all children at this time a very characteristic and spontaneous outburst of metaphysical curiosity: speculations regarding the origin of things, the first man, the creation of the world and of God Himself—to which we might add the marked preoccupation at the same time with questions about the origin of the individual, birth, the differences between the two sexes, and the process of generation.

If the child tries so hard, all at once, to know the origin of things—separately or taken all together—is it not because he has had till now a ready-made answer, spontaneous, instinctive, whose inadequacy he has just come to realise?

"It is a need of our nature to identify the supreme cause and the supreme ideal in which we

seek the law of our life." This assertion, formulated by Secrétan, is already valid for the young child.[5] The moment of which we are speaking is that in which he begins to discover that "the supreme ideal in which he seeks the law of his being" is not the "supreme cause" of all things.

This has been customarily represented as the *awakening* of intellectual curiosity: we believe, on the other hand, that it is necessary to see in it a *crisis,* at once intellectual and moral, comparable in many respects to the crisis of adolescence, and that we are here facing a crisis of religious experience.

We take it as normal that a young man should pass, a little after puberty, through a period of doubt in religious matters. His knowledge of science, or even—more simply—his everyday experience, leads him to criticise in particular the traditional ideas of divine omnipotence and sovereign goodness. From the dilemmas in which he is caught he escapes as he may; by an intellectual negation of the existence of God, by an act of submission to an authority (a tradition or a church), or by a personal affirmation of confidence in God, despite everything, which may be linked to more or less heretical qualifications. Be this as it may, thought is not, after this crisis, what it was before it.

The crisis of the reflective adolescent is merely

[5] Secrétan, *Le Principe de la Morale,* p. 34.

the repetition of a crisis more general still among children, which is determined, as the later crisis will be, by the conflict of observed facts with absolute affirmations of the same kind. Just as the adolescent will doubt the omnipotence and the moral perfection of God, so the child is forced one day to revise all the notions he has hitherto held regarding the omniscience, the omnipotence and the absolute holiness of his parents.

This revision, in reality a complete overturning, is painful: like all profound crises of the soul. The child does not pass through it lightheartedly. Those about him who, consciously or unconsciously, contribute to provoke the crisis, run the risk of being most unwelcome to him.

> A lady of our acquaintance remembers well her repugnance, as a child, for the idea of a Heavenly Father, who alone was completely good: her mother being quite sufficient for her.[6]

The following account is even more precise. A mother speaks of her little girl, who, at a rather early age—six years—had slipped into a

[6] It is to this same stage of development, we believe, that Rousseau's observation applies (*Emile*, Book IV). "If we speak to them" (*i.e.*, to children) "of the power of God, they think Him almost as strong as their father."

Sunday-school class with her brothers and sisters:

"They spoke of a perfect God, and Marie, whose jealous little soul was occupied with the love and authority of her parents, did not want this God. But the pretty, young teacher insisted that it was the duty of children to receive Him.

"From that time up to the last few months, Marie has constantly tried to find fault with God in order that she may find an excuse for rejecting Him.

"One day when her mother had broken off a stick for her, she had a moment of triumph: 'Look, two kinds of leaves on the same branch! God has made a mistake!' Her mother separated the two branches, so closely stuck to each other, and said—'God never makes mistakes.' Annoyed, Marie tried to score by pointing to the little wooden shoes worn by her brother to straighten his feet: 'All the same, he overlooked Jean's feet.'

"When she wakened, to find her room flooded with glorious sunshine, she said, as if thinking aloud—'Of course! Just when all the village needs rain so badly, God *would* send sunshine.'

"But this winter, Marie has learned through sorrow that parents are not everything in life, and that their powers are feeble and easily overcome. Jean has had typhoid fever. Her

grandfather and grandmother have both died.

"Then, from an anguished heart, Marie prayed.

"And now, we feel that she is trying to understand, without hostility. She reasons and reasons, desirous that her reasoning shall lead her to some logical conclusion and no longer merely to the experience of her own heart. . . ."

In several of the documents cited, the relation between the crisis determined by the revelation of a power superior to that of the father, and the religious experience, is clearly asserted. The little Hebbel speaks of it as a transition from a powerful to a more powerful being, and says that he experienced towards the far-off Father the same feelings he had hitherto felt for his parents.

Is this psychological sequence exceptional? There appear to be no grounds for believing it to be so. In describing the child's conception of his parents the word *divinisation* has frequently been used by various writers. This word, taken in its literal meaning, would imply that the child transfers to his parents the divine perfections which he has learned from those who give him religious teaching; and it is thus, according to Gosse, that the matter fell out in his own case. It is extremely unlikely that they happen thus in all cases, or even in the majority. In the realm of feeling, it is certain that children whom

nobody has taught to worship God "adore" their mother spontaneously. Now, as we have seen, this "adoration" is naturally expressed on the plane of thought by a "divinisation" which we must also consider to be spontaneous and instinctive.

Thus it becomes necessary, if we are not mistaken, to reverse our way of speaking, to speak of a "paternisation" of God rather than a "divinisation" of parents, and to see in filial adoration the prototype of religious feelings and the origin of theological dogmas. As the religion of the parents totters and falls in the tumult of the intellectual crisis of early childhood, there dawns for the child the religion of the Heavenly Father.

That we may make certain our conviction of this, let us concentrate our attention upon the divine perfection *par excellence,* upon that quality which is most closely linked to the act of worship: sanctity. It has a very special psychological content. To follow completely its development in the history of our race is beyond our powers. We see the notion of *saint* confused at first with that of *sacred,* enriching little by little its ritual significance with a moral content. The proclamation of the absolute sanctity of God is one of the most characteristic forms of worship.[1]

[1] "Heilig ist das Wort der Anbetung und gibt dem was wir bei der Anbetung empfinden sein sprachliches Zeichen." Schlatter, Das christliche Dogma, 1911, p. 157.

In this, above all, we feel that emotional elements predominate over conceptual notions. Let us try, nevertheless, to discover precisely what the latter may be, and here the dictionary will assist us. *Saint,* we read in Littré (after the enumeration of the senses in which the word most nearly retains its etymological meaning of the word *sancire*—to consecrate) *"saint:* of sovereign purity—used in this sense only of God."

We realise that this applies to moral purity. The classical dogmas, whose central thought Littré has rendered, emphasise this in their definitions: "Summa omnisque omnino labis aut vitii in Deo puritas, munditiem et puritatem debitam exigens a creaturis." [8]

Sanctity, holiness, is distinguished from absolute justice and from all-goodness, the positive attributes which characterise the action of the divinity in relation to men, by something negative in quality which should appear in the definition in order to make it complete. Other perfections of the divine being are those positive virtues which the infant is able to predicate of his parents, but sanctity, it would appear, must be arrived at in some other way. Are we over-bold in putting this idea in relation to an element of the infantile crisis, which we have already indicated but upon which we have not yet concen-

[8] Quenstedt, quoted by Gretillat. Dogmatique, I. 263.

trated our attention: the sexual element, and very notably that disillusion, often profound in character, which children realise when they discover the nature of the act of generation? This disillusion assumes sometimes the nature of a revolt, at the same time emotional and intellectual, as in the case of the child who, having been enlightened regarding the act by a schoolfellow, protested in terms at once naïve and touching: "Your father, perhaps, but not mine!"

In contrast with the earthly father who has done something "dirty," the adoration of the heart asserts a Holy Father, to whom anything filthy is utterly foreign.

This interpretation will win acceptance only if we insist in the first place upon the importance of the crisis in the child's life, notably in its intellectual bearings; and in the second place upon the theories, the myths and the stories he invents to liberate his little soul from its obsession with observed realities.[9] It will be necessary, too, to consider in how strict a relation Christian theology considers fatherhood and the divine being: the Nicean symbol, for example, insists on the eternal generation of the Son (*genitus non creatus*).

The belief in the supernatural birth of Christ

[9] I have given a number of these in an article entitled "La psychanalyse et l'éducation," published in the "Annuaire de l'Instruction publique en Suisse, 1920."

constitutes an exact counterpart of the transfer we have just described: the ideal purity of the earthly mother whom the child adores is carried over to the Immaculate Mother.[10]

If we wish, then, to discover the psychological origins of sanctity, we are compelled to go back to the adoration of the child for his parents; just as in the case of the other moral and metaphysical perfections.

In brief, the religious sentiment is the filial sentiment. The first object of this sentiment is, for the child, his parents. The father and mother are, for the child, his gods, possessed of all the divine perfections. But the experience of life compels the child to change, if not his religion, at least his god, and to transfer to a more remote being the wonderful attributes with which, in the first place, he endowed his parents.

We are able, to some extent, to follow this process of transfer in detail. The love of the child is, in the first instance, directed to the mother alone. The father, less near than the mother to the child, at first an object of fear, serves as a means by which the first stage of the transfer from a near to a more remote object is achieved. At this stage is effected that blending of love and fear which constitutes respect. It

[10] For a discussion of the Virgin mothers, the Vestals, see Frazer's *The Golden Bough.*

is doubtless at this intermediary stage that man must have come to conceive God, in spite of all the tenderness with which he invests his conception, as a father rather than as a mother.

Other stages of this transfer can be recognised. They deserve to be closely studied.

CHAPTER V

GOD AND THE GREAT FAMILY

THAT transfer of feeling which is initiated by the crisis we have just studied is not always, or exclusively, directed to the transcendent being for whom all the great historic religions have reserved the name of God. Between the father in the flesh and the heavenly Father there are intermediaries towards whom there may be directed the same sentiments which we have called filial in the one case and religious in the other, to whom the same beliefs may be attached: we mean the patriarch, the tribal chief, the monarch.

> "To speak of a king as *father of his people* is not so much to eulogise him as to call him by name, to define him." [1]

This reflection of La Bruyère assumes a meaning, at once both exact and novel, for us.

> "The Muzimbas, a people of South-eastern Africa, 'do not adore idols or recognise any

[1] La Bruyère, *Caractères*, Ch. X.

god, but instead they venerate and honour their king, whom they regard as a divinity, and they say he is the greatest and best in the world.' " [2]

"The necessity of guarding the king from every conceivable danger arises from his great importance for the weal and woe of his subjects. Strictly speaking, he is a person who regulates the course of the world; his people have to thank him not only for rain and sunshine, which allow the fruits of the earth to grow, but also for the wind which brings the ships to their shores and for the solid ground on which they set their feet. These savage kings are endowed with a wealth of power and an ability to bestow happiness which only gods possess." [3]

History teaches us that these beliefs and feelings are not exclusively confined to primitive peoples. In every epoch we find, in forms only slightly varied, the trinity of father, king and god united in the single person of the reigning monarch: DIVUS AUGUSTUS PATER PATRIAE, say the Roman inscriptions. The Pharaohs, Alexander, the Roman emperors, Innocent III and Boniface VIII, Louis XIV and (nearer to our

[2] Dos Santos, quoted by Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (abridged edition), p. 97.

[3] Freud, Totem and Taboo (London, George Routledge & Sons, 1919), pp. 73–74; quoting Frazer, Taboo—The Burden of Royalty, p. 7.

own time) "our little father the Czar," together with all the kings who claim divine right, show that the sentiments of veneration to which monarchs appeal are deeply and permanently rooted in the hearts of men, and that these sentiments develop naturally into dogmas of worship.

Let us quote some characteristic phrases of a Hymn to the King (Menephtah and Seti II) preserved on a papyrus:

> "Thou hast the form of thy Father Ra when He rises in the heavens: thy rays penetrate all the lands of the earth: without thy beauties may no place exist, and thy words rule the destinies of all peoples. When thou reclinest in thy palace, thou hearest all that is said of thee in all the earth, for thou hast millions of ears. Thine eye is brighter than the stars and more seeing than the sun. If a man speak, even though he be enclosed within the walls of a room, his voice shall reach thine ear. If any man shall perform a secret act, thine eye shall perceive it, O king, gracious lord, who givest to all the breath of life."
>
> "Thou art like Ra"—says a stele of Rameses II—"in all that thou dost, and moreover all the desires of thine heart are fulfilled: if thou wishest for a thing in the night, in the dawn it is by thee. . . . Whilst thou wert but a lad, with the tresses hanging over thy brow, already there was nothing not known to thee.

. . . When thou wert a youth, all the public works were in thy charge. . . . If thou sayest to the waters, 'Come upon the mountain,' the waters of heaven would obey the commandment of thy mouth. Thy words accomplish every day as much as did the word of Phtah when he created the worlds. Because thou art the Eternal One, all men do according to thy will and obey the words of thy mouth, Father, our Master." [4]

In more recent times, this same sentiment, at once filial and religious, has constituted what we are accustomed to speak of as the loyalty of a subject to his ruler. Though the beliefs expressed in loyalty may be less hyperbolical than those which found expression in the adoration of the pharaohs, they are nevertheless strictly related to them genetically. A psychologist has described loyalty as "the totality of the intellectual inhibitions which a man imposes on himself in order not to lose the faith he has put in his ideal of a hero," [5] and has pointed out a very

[4] From Maspero, *Au Temps de Ramsès et d'Assurbanipal,* Lectures Historiques (Hachette).

[5] "Die gefühlmässig erlebte, in der Form einer dauernden Gesinnung konzentrierte Gesamtheit der Denkhemmungen, die man sich auferlegt um den Glauben an das in sichtbare Erscheinung getretene Heldenideal nicht zu verlieren." Lorenz, *Der Politische Mythus,* Imago, VI (1920), p. 76.

This description, it may be noted in passing, recalls the naïve definition of religion given not long since by a school pupil: "Faith is when you believe what you know is not true." The two, taken together, exemplify very well inhibitions of thought of affective origin.

pretty analysis which is given in a passage of Marmont's memoirs:

> "In 1792, I had for the king a feeling difficult to define, but of which I could still find traces and even feel the power twenty-two years later, a feeling of devotion of an almost religious nature, an innate respect of the kind due to a being of a higher order. The word of the king had then a magic and a power which nothing could alter for those whose hearts were upright and pure. This love of the king became a kind of cult." [6]

Coming still nearer to our own time, it is instructive to read the hymns which certain inhabitants of Neuchâtel sang in 1831 in honour of their sovereign, the king of Prussia, at the very moment when his government was showing itself utterly deaf to the demands of the country:

> "Our prince is our father: he loves us as a father loves his only son: he sees our needs and knows our desires: he, like Providence, unseen by us, makes his presence felt through the benefits he confers upon us. . . ." [7]

How can we wonder, then, at the disillusionment of the little boy who said, after a royal

[6] Marechal Marmont, *Memoires,* I, 24–25.
[7] From the excellent *Histoire de la révolution neuchâteloise* of Arthur Piaget, Vol. III, pp. 86, 94 *et passim.*

visit: "But, papa, the king and the queen are a gentleman and a lady!"

Even amongst republicans, the adoration of the childish soul for the chief of the state shows itself in a fashion which, whilst altogether unexpected, is for our purpose very instructive:

> "This incident occurred," a correspondent writes to me, "in the case of a little boy of ten or eleven years of age. His mother—from whom I learned the story—had courageously answered his questions about the birth of children and the act of generation; the child listening seriously, but with an expression of increasing indignation. At last, turning on his heel away from her, he cried out: 'I am sure that Wilson and Gustav Ador never did such a thing!' This was in 1917, when all the idealism of little Swiss children was embodied in the two presidents."

If the cult of the Virgin may be set in parallel with the adoration of the God, *patriotism* and *loyalty* may be considered as standing in the same relation to each other—the country is the mother, as the king is the father: to her all the powers of love of the child are also directed.

We are not here attempting to seek out the historical origins of the idea—or rather, the sentiment of patriotism; nor attempting to follow its development. It would be superfluous to indi-

cate its relation to filial piety, since this is shown by the name itself. Without doubt many fine shades might be distinguished. Let us restrict ourselves to the consideration of the first modern expressions of patriotism. In ancient Greece the duty of defending the natal soil was set in relation to a myth in which the earth was spoken of as a mother, in a quasi-literal sense.

> "I will attempt," says Plato, "first of all to persuade the governors themselves, and the soldiers, and then the rest of the state, that, whatever training or education we gave them, all these particulars seemed to affect and befall them like dreams, while really they were in course of formation and development beneath the earth, where they fabricated not only themselves, but also their armour and equipments: but after they were completely fashioned, the earth, who is their mother, brought them forth; and now they ought to consult the interests of the country in which they reside as for a mother and nurse, and to defend her in case of invasion, and to look upon the rest of the citizens as their brethren, and sprung from the same soil." [8]

What interests us at this point is the relation which exists between the patriotic sentiment and that other modification of the filial sentiment, the religious sentiment, for their common origin

[8] Plato, *The Republic,* Bk. III, Ch. 21, Cary's translation.

goes far to explain their union and their rivalry in the human soul.

Let us seek in the great religious society, the Church, those sentiments which correspond exactly to loyalty and patriotism. Both are here tinged with filial piety. On the one side we find the deference paid to the ecclesiastical superior, the Holy Father or Pope, and on the other, the tender and passionate attachment to the spiritual Mother and to the Church. Both alike attribute to their objects absolute and paradoxical perfections—infallibility, eternity, etc.

There is another point. The religious and the patriotic sentiments have often been confused with one another. Since both are family sentiments, they have been regarded by the community as identical. National religions and religious patriotisms have been frequent in history. Doubtless the moment arrived, notably in the Hebrew school of prophets, when men distinguished between the two notions. One form of patriotism appeared to them like the modern form of idolatry, the worship of false gods.[9] A remark of a Berlin professor of theology may be quoted in this connection: "When the religion of the German people during the war comes to be studied later on, it will be seen that we have returned to that of Israel in the time of

[9] Cf. Félix Bovet, *Pensées*, 106–108.

the patriarchs." He was but repeating what Rambert said in 1871—"In wartime polytheism is the most rational of religions."

The psychological resemblances and ethical contrasts of the two sentiments have been powerfully and clearly expressed by M. Neeser.[10] As a matter of fact, in certain individuals the two may be identified with each other in the most complete manner. Can we possibly read Robert Dubarle's hymn, "A la Patrie," for example, otherwise than as an expression of complete religious consecration?[11]

Patriotic adoration has precisely the same intellectual consequences as the other forms of adoration we have already discussed. However sharp the resulting conflict with actual fact may be, adoration cannot but insist upon the absolute quality of the perfections attributed to the object. France becomes "eternal." Germany is exalted "over all." British patriotism is "beyond good and evil." Switzerland, in an occasional prayer, is boasted of as "our incomparable fatherland." If these logically absurd expressions have power to move us, it is because we feel beneath the apparent absurdity an extraordinary intensity of disinterested feeling.

[10] Neeser, *La morale évangélique et la guerre,* Revue de théol. et de phil, No. 12 (1914).

[11] *Lettres de guerre de Robert Dubarle,* préf. de Louis Barthou, 1898, pp. 263–274.

The simple fact that the fatherland is always perceived as a mother ought to be strongly emphasised. We might equally well justify our attachment to our native soil by regarding it as the land of our sons and by making the fatherland a daughter. But we feel instinctively that this pragmatic conception, though perhaps more moral, would mean a profound difference in our patriotism. The daughter-fatherland shocks our patriotic feelings in much the same way that the youthful conquering God of H. G. Wells upsets our religious feelings. For our patriotic and religious feelings are alike, in essence, filial and respectful.

The strict relationship of the two sentiments is demonstrated not only by those who abandon themselves to both at the same time (patriotic religion) or to one only with the exclusion of the other (religious anti-patriotism); but also by those who resist both.[12]

"Neither God nor master. . . ." The origin of this formula is the rebellion of the child against paternal authority. A contemporary writer, dealing with the psychology of revolutionary movements, says that the state of mind of the Germany of today is that of a society without

[12] See Hamon, *Psychologie de l'anarchiste socialiste.* 3rd Edn., Paris, 1895. See especially the citation from Retté—"I hate laws, gods, fatherlands, authority. . . ."

a father.[13] Happy France, says he, who, at the very moment when she lost her traditional faith in her rulers, felt surging in her the sacred love of the fatherland, which took in her at once the place of filial piety and religious faith.

[13] Federn, *Zur Psychologie der Revolution. Die vaterlose Gesellschaft,* Vienna, 1919. See also *Imago,* VI, I, p. 91.

CHAPTER VI

GOD IN THE WORLD

How does the child, who in the first instance adores his parents, transfer to a remote object those perfections which he attributes in the first place to his father and mother? This problem has never been sufficiently studied. It has scarcely even been propounded.

It would be necessary that an informed observer should meet with a child about to pass through the crisis we have described and should closely observe him as he passes through it; and that he should be both fortunate and expert enough to read in the soul and intelligence of the child the sequence of ideas and reasonings there for one or two years. The excellent studies of M. Piaget at the Institut J.-J. Rousseau have already indicated to us the way in which this should be done.[1] We know, thanks to him, how the child of from six to ten explains the world

[1] Piaget, *Le représentation du monde chez l'enfant* (Paris, Alcan, 1927).

and natural phenomena to himself. The relation between the child's cosmogony and the child's religion has yet to be investigated.

All, or practically all the children in whom we have so far studied religious feelings and ideas belong to Christian families. They have found ready made for them in their environment the notion of an omnipotent God, maker of heaven and earth. We have often seen this idea presented to them before they had demanded it, and the God thus supplied to them was spontaneously given a share of their adoration. When we are able to observe, through retrospection in certain special cases, such as those of Hebbel and of Gosse, the displacement of the effective energies of the child who abandons his first divinity for the God of whom he learns from his parents, we realise that the God of his new religion is not the fruit of spontaneous reflection.

The opinion was formerly held that the idea of creation was confined to the "revealed" religions; and when, a quarter of a century ago, Andrew Lang, combatting the theories of animism and naturalism prevalent in his own day, drew attention to the All-Father of several aboriginal Australian tribes, he was suspected of trying to introduce, under cover of anthropology, the idea of "primitive revelation."

In view of the fact that the child is surrounded by theology and religion, how may we discover those religious ideas which are truly *his own*—those which represent the solution he would find for himself at the crisis of his primitive religion?

It would seem that we could seek this information only in some of those "natural experiences" which sometimes occur free of human intervention. Certain souvenirs of the deaf and dumb are worth reflecting upon in this connection: William James has quoted at length the notes of one of these, Ballard, who received no lessons till he was eleven years old. But before that time the child had discovered, on his own account, problems which it is worth while to recall here:

(His father frequently took him for walks.)

"I have a vivid recollection of the delight I felt in watching the different scenes we passed through, observing the various phases of nature, both animate and inanimate; though we did not, owing to my infirmity, engage in conversation. It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: *How came the world into being?* When this question occurred to my mind, I set myself to thinking it over a long time. My curiosity

was awakened as to what was the origin of human life in its first appearance upon the earth, and of vegetable life as well, and also the cause of the existence of the earth, sun, moon and stars. . . .

"I have no recollection of what it was that first suggested to me the question as to the origin of things. I had before this time gained ideas of the descent from parent to child, of the propagation of animals, and of the production of plants from seeds. The question that occurred to my mind was: whence came the first man, the first animal, and the first plant, at the remotest distance of time, before which there was no man, no animal, no plant; since I knew they all had a beginning and an end.

" . . . Man and the earth were the two things on which my mind dwelled most.

"I think I was five years old, when I began to understand the descent from parent to child and the propagation of animals. I was nearly eleven years old, when I entered the Institution where I was educated; and I remember distinctly that it was at least two years before this time that I began to ask myself the questions as to the origin of the universe. My age was then about eight, not over nine years.

" . . . I believed the sun and moon to be round, flat plates of illuminating matter; and for those luminaries I entertained a sort of reverence on account of their power of light-

ing and heating the earth. I thought from their coming up and going down, travelling across the sky in so regular a manner that there must be a certain something having power to govern their course. . . .

"The source from which the universe came was the question about which my mind revolved in a vain struggle to grasp it, or rather to fight the way up to attain to a satisfactory answer. When I had occupied myself with this subject a considerable time, I perceived that it was a matter much greater than my mind could comprehend; and I remember well that I became so appalled at its mystery and so bewildered at my inability to grapple with it that I laid the subject aside and out of my mind, glad to escape being, as it were, drawn into a vortex of inextricable confusion. Though I felt relieved at this escape, yet I could not resist the desire to know the truth; and I returned to the subject; but as before, I left it, after thinking it over for some time. In this state of perplexity, I hoped all the time to get at the truth, still believing that the more I gave thought to the subject, the more my mind would penetrate the mystery. Thus I was tossed like a shuttlecock, returning to the subject and recoiling from it, till I came to school." [2]

[2] William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 266–268.

At ten years of age, Helen Keller spontaneously asked questions of the same kind: "Who made the sky, the sea, and everything?"

In the recollections of the deaf and dumb American boy, D'Estrella,[8] we find less metaphysical unrest, more partial explanations of the principal natural phenomena. The child resorts at once to animism and artificialism. The latter term is one coined by Brunschvicg, and defined by Piaget as "the tendency to look upon nature as fabricated by man, or as making itself by processes similar to human crafts."

> The boy had many notions of his own. He believed that the earth was flat and the sun a ball of fire. At first he thought that there were many suns, one for each day. He could not make out how they could rise and set. One day he happened to see some boys throwing and catching burning oil-soaked balls of yarn. He turned his mind to the sun, and thought that it must have been thrown up caught just the same—but by what force? So he supposed that there was a great and strong man, somehow hiding himself behind the hills (San Francisco being a hilly city). The sun was his ball of fire as a toy, and he amused himself in throwing it very high in the sky every morning and catching it every evening.

[8] William James, *Thought before Language: a deaf mute's recollections*, Philosophical Review, I, 1892, pp. 613–624.

After he began to convince himself about the possible existence of such a mighty god, he went on with his speculations. He supposed that the god lit the stars for his own use, as we do the gas-lights in the street. When there was wind he supposed that it was the indication of his passions. A cold gale bespoke his anger, and a cool breeze his happy temper. Why? Because he had sometimes felt the breath bursting out from the mouth of the angry people in the act of quarreling or scolding. When there were clouds he supposed they came from the big pipe of the god. Why? Because he had often seen, with childish wonder, how the smoke curled from lighted pipes or cigars. He was often awed by the fantastic shapes of the floating clouds. What strong lungs the god had! When there was a fog, the boy supposed that it was the breath in the cold morning. Why? Because he had often seen his own breath in such weather. When there was rain, he did not doubt that the god took in much water, and spewed it from his mouth in the form of a shower. Why? Because he had several times watched how cleverly the heathen Chinese spewed the water from his mouth over the washed clothes.

"Let me add as to the origin of the ocean. One day I went with some boys to the ocean. They went bathing. I first went into the ocean,

not knowing how it tasted and how strong the waves rolled. I came near being drowned. I could not swim. I went to the bottom and instinctively crawled up on the sand. I spit the salt water out of my mouth, and wondered why the water was so salty. I thought that it was the urine of that mighty god." [4]

Little D'Estrella's animistic representations are more striking still. With Piaget, we understand by animism "the tendency of children to regard inanimate objects as living and conscious."

Nothing stimulated his curiosity like the moon. He was afraid of the moon, but he loved to watch her. He noticed the shadowy face in the full moon. Then he supposed she was a living being. So he tried to prove whether the moon was alive or not. It was accordingly done in four different ways. First he shook his head in a zig-zag direction, with his eyes fixed on the moon. She appeared to follow the motions of his head, now rising and then lowering, turning forward and backward. He also thought that the lights were alive too, because he repeated similar experiments.

[4] These citations are all taken from the same article of William James. The passages in the third person are taken from an article published in the first instance in 1889, but already edited by D'Estrella himself; the others are taken from a very interesting letter written to James by the deaf mute.

Secondly while walking out, he watched whether the moon would follow him. The orb seemed to follow him everywhere. Thirdly he wondered why the moon appeared regularly. So he thought she must have come out to see him alone. Then he talked to her in gestures and fancied that he saw her smile or frown. Fourthly, he found that he had been whipped oftener when the moon was visible. It was as though she were watching him and telling his guardian (he being an orphan boy) all about his bad capers. He often asked himself who she could be. At last he became sure that she was his mother, because, while his mother lived, he had never seen the moon. Afterwards every now and then, he saw the moon and behaved well towards his friends.

The moon became linked to the whole of this child's moral life.

The boy was never bad on Sundays. In fair weather he would always go to church and Sunday-school. Why? Because he fancied that the moon wanted him to go, as he had been in the habit of going to the Catholic church with his mother. He was in rags sometimes, but the church-people and the Sunday-school children were generally kind to the homeless little boy. He had some faint idea of death. He saw a dead baby in a little

coffin. He was told that it could not eat, drink or speak, and so it would go into the ground and never, never come back home. Again, he was told that he would get sick and go down into the ground. He got angry. He said that he would go up to the sky where his moon-mother wanted him.

Regarding this religion of the moon, which is, in a remarkable degree, a religion of conscience, D'Estrella gives us some important details. He has an early memory of his mother:

"My first recollection is that I cried. I think I was four years old then. One morning mother left me alone for the first time in a room and locked the door. I was afraid because I had never remained alone in a closed room. So I cried. She came back in soon and ran laughing to me. She comforted and caressed me with kisses of love. This only is all that I can think instinctively of a mother's love.

"While my mother was alive (i. e. before I was five) I did not know that I was deaf. I did not see the sun and stars figuratively. I remember that I had never observed the moon but once with a sort of wonder,—the moon was new." (This is probably a *lapsus calami*: after the context, it should read: the moon was full.)

A little after the death of his mother, the boy was sent to the home of a Mexican woman who ill-treated him.

"Hitherto till this time I had but a little, if ever possibly, of instinctive language. I could hardly make intelligible signs; but my mother might understand my gestures, that is such as were moved by feelings for what I should either wish or deny. For example, the idea of food was aroused in my mind by the feeling of hunger. This simply constitutes the Logic of Feeling; bear in mind that is different from the Logic of Signs. I could neither think nor reason at all, yet I could recognise persons either with delight or with dislike. Still nearly all the human emotions were absent, and even the faculty of conscience was wanting. Everything seemed to appear blank around me except the momentary pleasures of perception. What happened at home had not come back to my memory until I went to school. The state of my mental isolation, I believe, is wholly due to my confinement at home. I was then five years old, though.

"But no sooner had I been left in charge of my guardian than the knowledge of good and evil was opened to me slowly but surely. As Minerva the goddess of wisdom was said to have leaped forth out of the brain of her father Jupiter, full grown and fully armed

for the business of life, so was my new life formed aparently mature and complete. The unwomanly treatment of my guardian was, in truth, the direct cause of the evolution of my instinctive—or, better speaking—latent feelings for the higher. Not only could I think in pictures, but almost spontaneously I was also able to learn how to think and reason. I learned to know that there was a difference between right and wrong, and to understand that there was a relation between cause and effect. This proves that my conscience must have been in the act of development. My mental condition was favourably elaborated and reduced to the Logic of Signs. I had no intuitive conscience at all. There might possibly be a mote of it when I thought of the moon (you have already known my cosmology)."

Nevertheless he was a bad boy. He took to habits of stealing. He recounts the animistic speculations which induced him to return to better ways.

From the till of a butcher from whom he had already stolen money, he took a gold piece; thinking that he was taking a silver quarter-dollar. Before he had examined the coin he held in his hand, he hurried to the confectioner's to buy sweets.

"I put the money on the counter. It was gold!—ten dollars! I felt as though I was a

fish out of the water, with my eyes shooting out. At once I took it back and ran out. I could see nothing but gold everywhere. My heart beat. Did I know that I was guilty? If so, how could I know? Simply by seeing that I had stolen *too much.*"

He went back again to buy the sweets. The change was handed to him—a large number of silver coins.

"The silver was now too heavy for me to carry along as easily. I went some way with caution and hid all the money under a saloon. I felt free. I thought of going to the minstrels in the evening. When the time came I went back for the money. I found it all gone. I was momentarily disappointed, but in fact I felt happier than sorry for my conscience's sake. Strange to say, anybody, even the butcher, never gave me to understand that I had been suspected of theft. Still more strange, I have never stolen money again. Besides, I did not steal as many other things, particularly food, as I used to. My conscience must have become keen enough. It began developing more and more, mainly owing to the influence of the moon. (Then the moon was full, when I found the money gone.) Therefore my cosmological speculations came out, as those already given in the Annals."

However incomplete they may be, these indications of cosmological reflections, necessarily spontaneous, of deaf-mutes, they are of immense value. They show that the child is able, independently of external influences, to conceive in Nature, or behind Nature, persons who are very powerful, very great, very benevolent. In the case of our deaf-mutes, one of these powers of Nature (the moon, according to little D'Estrella) appears to have a religious character: it is a god, and even a moral god. The little that we know of the origin of this little deaf and dumb boy's religion shows us that this child (like Saint Teresa)[5] projects upon a new object, at the death of his mother, the feeling with which she had inspired him. He has, too, the clear impression that his thought was unloosened by the bad treatment to which he was subjected by the worthless woman who had charge of him.

Is this transfer of love and respect on to a heavenly body by a child a fact which, if not unique, must be looked upon as altogether exceptional?

Before replying to this question, it is worth while to refer to the account of an experiment of the kind we require at this point, narrated at the beginning of the nineteenth century by a German theologian, C. F. Sintenis (1750-1805).

[5] See p. 21, note 6.

We introduce it here in a quotation from Father Grégoire Girard,[6] to whom we owe our knowledge of it:—

> "M. Sintenis had lived in the town, and had retired to a small estate in the country, saddened at the loss of a young and dearly loved wife. From her he had but one son, a boy still very young. The child had been brought up in such strict isolation, that it was impossible that he could have heard or read the name of God. . . . The son, who tells the story, had no communication with any other person than his father. Lessons were ordinarily given in the open air, in presence of the objects and phenomena of nature which were the principal subject matter of instruction. Lessons in Latin were added to lessons in the mother tongue. For a long time all instruction was oral, and the child did not learn to read till some time after. At the age of ten he had neither heard nor read the name of God."

Father Girard is mistaken in regarding the book, in which he found the narrative, as an account of an actual experience of its author.[7]

[6] Le P. Girard, *De l'enseignement régulier de la langue maternelle.*

[7] *Pistevon, oder Ueber das Dasein Gottes,* 1800. We have seen a 3rd edition (Leipzig), in which the passages cited appear on pp. 124–130 (VII. Betrachtung).

In the preface to the work the narrator is presented as a third party. Further, the details with which the account begins and which Father Girard summarises do not at all square with what we know of the life of Sintenis.[8] The author has made for us either a piece of edifying fiction without authenticity whatsoever, or—what appears to me the more reasonable supposition—a literary composition based upon episodes with which Sintenis was acquainted, though he was not himself the hero of them.[9] Be that as it may, the text agrees in a very striking fashion with what we know from other scources of the theology of children, and for this reason it has seemed interesting to quote it, even though its documentary validity is open to doubt.

Let us give the words of the pupil himself:

"My father was anxious to know if there existed in man, over and above the rational disposition—the disposition to notions in general—the disposition to a notion of God. Such was the motive underlying the education he gave me.

"He himself had been educated in a strictly Protestant school. Under the auspices of Hutter, Gerhard and Melanchthon, etc., he

[8] Cf. F. W. von Schutz: C. F. Sintenis Leben und Wirken als Mensch, Schriftsteller und Kanzelredner. Eine biographische Skizze. Zerbst, 1820.

[9] The hypothesis of invention is tantamount to the recognition in Sintenis of powers of psychological intuition amounting to genius.

had been taught that there exists in every man a notion of God which has been sown, planted, impressed and graven on him; that belief in a God who is unique, great, good, deserving of honor, etc., is innate in man. The precaution he took in my upbringing were designed to prove whether this was the truth or merely a pious fiction.

"As far as I was concerned, nothing of the kind was ever manifested. All that occurred was the work of my reason, after it had been developed by surrounding influences, by my own experiences, and by all sorts of knowledge communicated to me by my father. It was the need of knowing causes (Verlangen nach Grund) which in this matter acted upon me as the primary electric shock.

"In short, I remember very exactly that I used to look upon the sun as the cause of everything that men were unable to perform, but which nevertheless happened. *Whenever I could not attribute something to my father,* or to other men, I attributed it to no other than the sun.

"Briefly, the sun was more to me than all men put together. This was because I saw infinitely more things that were not made by men than were made by them. Thus, in reality, the sun was for me God, though I did not know the word 'God'. Everything that happened in the night, whose cause I

did not know, I attributed to the sun, believing it a consequence of the presence of the sun during the day. It is impossible for me to believe that in the religion of the sun there could be found a vestal who paid to the sun a homage more pure and deep than my own. My father noticed it and was happy. 'That boy will attain to something,' he thought. He left me to my own devices for a long time. At last he came across me kneeling in the garden with my hands extended towards the rising sun, and thought that the time had come to put an end to my honest errors. This at least is what he told me at the time, and often repeated afterwards; he could not allow me to be mistaken, for I was old enough now to know myself and realise what I was doing and to remember it. What did he do? He took advantage of a clear night at the time of the new moon: making me contemplate the majesty of the starry heavens, he told me only that the innumerable stars I saw were, with but a few exceptions, suns themselves, perhaps even greater than *my* sun. It was (and I remember it as well as if it had happened but yesterday) as if someone had dealt me a deadly blow. *It was ended* now, all my veneration for the sun, and *I did not know where to direct the worship I had hitherto devoted to the sun.* It would perhaps have been very natural to have distributed my worship over

all the suns. But this did not meet my needs: *for a long time I had devoted my whole veneration to a single sun,* that had become for me henceforth infinitely diminished. I lost a gaiety which had previously never been lacking in me.

"My father acted as if he had noticed nothing: he went on to give me correct astronomical knowledge. I listened as if I were listening to God Himself. And, in reality, it was to Him I was listening without clearly recognising it. The startling connection between the infinitude of the universe and a single unity made a deep impression upon me. There stirred in me a question which I had not been able to ask when hearing him speak of the innumerable multitude of suns, because I then knew nothing of that relation which bound them all into a single unity. What, then, happened in the end? One clear moonlight night, when my father led me once more into the garden and made me repeat to him all that I had learned of the heavens and added further information, the question born deep within me presented itself with urgency: 'My father, dear father, you have lowered the sun in my eyes. It was to him that I attached myself. It was he whom I believed gave us life and happiness, and blessed me and all other things. All those millions and myriads of suns up there must stand in some inexpres-

sible relation—there must be *one*. . . . Tell me, tell me who all these suns are . . . who? . . . who? . . . Or why?' Then my father intervened, telling me of the Sun of all suns, the original Sun, unique, invisible and eternal, cause of the bond between the suns, who did not Himself dwell in any of the suns thus bound together. Hardly had he spoken when I threw myself on his neck: together we fell on our knees. From that moment I became as happy as I had formerly been: even happier. I had the impression, too, that I was wiser than I had ever been and could not conceive that it was possible to be wiser."

The details of this extract, which I hope has not seemed unduly long, make comment unnecessary. I have italicised the passages of the narrative which most clearly relate to facts we have been able to observe in other cases, and which appear especially full of significance. We should not now propound the question of the origin of ideas in the same terms in which it was formulated in 1750, and to many of my readers the citation from Sintenis will scarcely appear as a demonstration of the purely rational origin of the idea of God. But the fact that it gives us something other than its author was seeking does not make the narrative any less interesting.

It seems above all important to say at this

point that what gives their real value to these exceptional cases we have just quoted, is the confirmation of them found through the observation of normal children. We find here and there in various books most valuable indications of this. Lay mentions in connection with one of Ballard's observations the prayers that his little son of six addressed to the moon.[10] And our evidence is not limited to a few isolated cases.

In the course of enquiries, extending over two or three years, into the thought of children, M. Jean Piaget has proved that all children between six and eleven years of age explain nature and the world by means of animistic or artificialistic theories at all points like those which we have just cited. As far as they attribute to the planets, to the wind, to water, to clouds, a consciousness and a life which makes them intelligent—wise, one might say—persons, so far is the current of their thought animistic. As far as they believe all that exists on the earth and in the sky, the land, the trees, the mountains, the sea, the rivers, the clouds, the sun, to be the product of human

[10] "I am able to add, that my son K., at the age of six years, when he was alone in his room, prayed to the moon, which he saw through the window." Lay, *Experimentelle Didaktik*, p. 50.
In a recent biography (*A. Wautier d'Avgalliers, Un homme*, Pastor Charles Wagner, Paris, 1927) we read: ". . . with the coming of night, the stars made on me an extraordinary impression. I used to speak to them, and they spoke to me. And I still recall the little balcony in front of our house, where I used to fall on my knees to adore the moon," p. 12.

activity, so far is the current of their thought artificialistic. Men have hollowed out the oceans or built the mountains; clouds are formed of smoke rising from houses; if the evening clouds are red, it is because they contain something of the fires which have given birth to them. . . . Men are the source of all things: this is artificialism. That the men are sometimes spoken of as "good gods," Piaget shows, matters little, for this God, or these gods, cannot be distinguished from men. The extraordinary power conferred on them has not any religious value in itself, since these powers have not in the first instance anything superhuman about them for the child. The very general character of these conceptions and the characteristic stages which Piaget has distinguished in their development makes it possible to consider them as the result of any teaching imposed from without.

Here we have primitive thought—the child's own thinking.

Further, contrary to the view which has often been favourably regarded by the anthropologists, we do find that animism gives place to artificialism, or *vice versa.* The two stages are simultaneous, and, as Piaget has shown, the two interpretations are jointly held. However foreign it may seem to the adult intelligence, the idea of the "manufacture of living things" is not

in the least repugnant to the child. Mountain, plant, cloud and sun itself can be living and conscious whilst being directly or indirectly the products of human activity. A careful study shows that this is the implicit explanation that the child gives of the world about him. Very finely Piaget has analysed the essential factors of this belief; we can only refer the reader to his excellent studies. We restrict ourselves here to saying that for Piaget the first of these factors is the child's certainty of the omnipotence of his parents, which our earlier chapters have attempted to make clear.

To sum up, we find ourselves in possession of the following results: the child, just after the sixth year, spontaneously asks himself questions about natural phenomena and the origin of things. He finds the answer in the intervention of persons, to whom he naturally attributes the power, wisdom and goodness with which he has endowed his parents. Thus, independently of any religious teaching, are realised those conditions which, on the occurrence of the crisis which shatters the childish faith in the parents, enable him to discover in the universe someone whom he may endow with attributes at once paternal and divine.

We have already said that the details—and in particular the chronological stages of this

transfer are insufficiently known. We hope, in these days when the religious psychology of the child has become a matter of great and general interest, that the clear indication of the problem and its nature will stimulate the careful researches which will alone enable us to solve it.

We content ourselves by adding that amongst the persons at once wise and powerful with whom the thought of the child peoples the world, none appears to lend himself so easily to "paternisation" as the sun. Renan has already said:[11] "Before religion had arrived at the point of proclaiming that the place of God was in the realm of the absolute and the ideal, that is to say, outside the world, one single cult was reasonable and scientific, the cult of the sun. The sun is our motherland. . . ."

This is not the place to demonstrate the astounding vitality of the cult of the sun, from the worship of primitive peoples to mithraism and our own festival of Easter and to Julian the Apostate: it would be especially interesting to emphasise the *paternal* and *royal* attributes of the sun. Very often the diverse concurrent objects of the child's religion—father, king and sun—are amalgamated in a diversity of ways.

We ponder a reflection of a child of four and a half years of age. He belonged to a Christian

[11] Renan, *Dialogues philosophiques*, p. 168.

family, said his prayers every night and was often spoken to about God. He went out one day, after a heavy shower, with one of his aunts. Suddenly the sun pierced the clouds. "God has come down to the earth," said the child.

"What makes you say that?" asked his aunt.

"Because the sun has come down to the earth and God is in the sun."

Mlle. Guex, assistant at the Institut J.-J. Rousseau, has been kind enough to communicate to me the replies given by a boy of eight in the course of an enquiry she was making:

"To Louis, the sun is a being alive and animate, 'who hears us speak' and who sees the kind of weather we are having. 'Sometimes the sun goes to another country, when it is raining here. Some days, when it rises, it sees that the weather is bad, and then it goes to see where the fine weather is.' 'Does the sun know what we call it?' 'Yes, it knows when we love it, and it is very kind to make us warm.' 'If we speak to the sun, does it hear us?' 'Yes, when we pray to it at night.' . . . 'Do you pray to it?' 'Yes.' . . . 'Does it know what you ask it?' 'Yes'. . . . 'Who taught you to pray to the sun?' 'At Sunday-school, they taught me always to pray to the sun. It could do good to all the world.' . . . 'Is the sun God, then?' 'Yes, it must be God,

because God does good, and so does the sun.' "

(We find in these replies, in company with the traits that Piaget has demonstrated in childish cosmology, a very curious identification of the sun and God. The child appears to have brought into the closest relation his own god with the God of whom he learned in the Christian Sunday-school.)

Analogous syncretisms are met with often in the early history of religions. The older cult object subsisted by the side of the new, of which it became a support, an attribute or a symbol. Reinach has shown this to be so in the case of the theriomorphic gods. The inscription of the name of Jesus on the sun which has always figured in the arms of Geneva [12] is a further instance of the same phenomenon, which seems a historical parallel to the naïve replies of little Louis.

We have quoted a striking example of the identification of the sun, the father and the king in the invocations to Pharaoh given earlier in this chapter. Sir James Frazer [13] has brought together two very striking texts from the writings of egyptologists:

" 'In the course of his existence,' says M. Moret, 'the king of Egypt exhausted all the

[12] Cf. Deonna, *Le soleil dans les armoiries de Genève. Revue d'histoire des religions*, 1915.

[13] Frazer. *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, p. 148.

possible conceptions of divinity which the Egyptians had framed for themselves.' "

" 'Whatever in fact might be asserted of the sun-god was dogmatically predicable of the king of Egypt. His titles were directly derived from those of the sun-god.' " (Cited from Renouf.)

"In China," writes M. Loisy,[14] "the existence of the son of Heaven was a ministry at once cosmic and religious, political and moral, in which the sovereign appeared to be a magical regulator of the seasons, a priest performing homage to the great spirits and to his ancestors, a law-giver and a model of morality. One might say that on his shoulders, as on those of the king of Egypt, rested the order of the universe and the prosperity of the empire as well as the control of his people."

Let us return to the child. The son of Sintenis attributed to the sun all that his father was incapable of performing. Just as the sun is a substitute, taking the place of the primitive god, so the God who wishes to be worshipped in spirit and in truth comes to take the place of sun and king, nature and fatherland.

[14] Loisy, *La religion*, 1917, p. 109.

CHAPTER VII

TOWARDS GOD THE SPIRIT

Two of the instances cited in the last chapter show us the limits of human reflection. Little Ballard, after a number of vain efforts to resolve the problems of the origin of man and of the world, renounced the attempt as one beyond his powers: he received help from outside through instruction. The child Sintenis, left to himself, discovered an object which satisfied his religious sentiment, but was not able of himself to deliver himself from the crisis which supervened when he learned that the sun was not in reality that unique object which his need of adoration demanded.

Till now we have applied ourselves to studying, as far as we were able, the religion and spontaneous theology of the child; but without being able altogether to abstract the influence exercised by the religious tradition accepted by the people about him, which often forms the material of definite instruction.

A history of the development of the notion of

number would necessarily borrow its material from the psychology of the child and of primitive races, but it could not entirely confine itself to documents of that kind. A moment comes when the history of mathematics ceases to be the recital of the experiences which are, so to speak, common to the race, and becomes a record of individual discoveries. Imaginary and transfinite numbers are events in mathematical history, and in them we have progress which is due to individual men of genius. And if in our schools adolescents or even children are capable of understanding fully these discoveries, and to some extent of participating in them, we may feel surprised that what demanded in the first instance the protracted meditation of an Archimedes or a Pascal should be comprehended in a few hours by a college student of average intelligence—it remains for us none the less to realise that in order to retrace the developments of his subject the scholar must abandon the field of genetic psychology for those of history and biography.

The same thing is true of the study of the notion of God. We may note that the conditions of the highest religious experiences are realised in children without claiming that all children realise them; or that they liberate spontaneously what the great religious geniuses have evolved

for humanity. The transfer of paternal and divine attributes to an invisible and spiritual object, of whom the earthly father, the king and the sun are no more than symbols; whose family, not limited by the boundaries of the fatherland, embraces all humanity; whose kingdom is not of this world—this transfer undoubtedly marks a stage in the religious development of those children who arrive at it spontaneously. But humanity, as a whole, has not yet achieved it.

It remains, for the present, a personal achievement of some great geniuses only: many profit by it, but it is not yet the patrimony of all. Very often, too, in the history of religion, individuals and peoples who appeared to have reached this stage of religious development have lapsed and fallen back into one or other of the earlier phases of the religious history of the race.

To indicate in the history of religion the important dates in connection with the discovery of the spiritual God, Father of mankind, it would be necessary to recall the principal figures of the line of the Hebrew prophets and their culmination in Jesus of Nazareth, and to indicate through the centuries of Christianity the place of many apostles of the inner light, of mystical religion, who have not been confined within the limits of any single race, church, ritual or doctrine.

We are not attempting to give a historical account of God the Spirit any more than we attempted a similar task in connection with the Father-God and the Sun-God. We wished only to remind the reader, by means of allusions to the vicissitudes of this history, of the formidable obstacles which the idea has encountered in the course of its progress.

It seems certain that, left to themselves, the majority of children would never attain this peak of development. We disclaim then the intention of generalising from the evidence of the spontaneous reflections of children (which can exist only in the case of altogether exceptional children) behind which we have good reason for suspecting the determining influence of a milieu; but believe this to be a suitable place to emphasise the part played by the filial sentiment in the passage from the spontaneous religion of the child to the worship of God in spirit and in truth.

O Father whom my father loves . . . is a famous line in which Lamartine resumes an experience often repeated. It is under the influence of the sentiments which his parents inspire in him that the child's elation of heart is carried over to the objects which they indicate to him.

"In repeating the prayers which my mouth lisped for the first time after my beloved mother, the love of her and the love of God are united, in some strange fashion, in one feeling." [1]

Among the notes which a Swiss pastor has entrusted to me occurs the following:

"I commenced my religious life by adoring a loving God in the person of my parents. My father, my mother, and my grandmother formed in the unity of the family a trinity of persons to whom was alternatively directed my 'domestic cult.' . . . The great affection I bore my grandmother transformed itself into silent worship one night when, entering her bedroom, I saw this wonderful woman on her knees in prayer at the foot of her bed. Then, perhaps for the first time, I realised that behind my domestic divinities there existed a being, mysterious and hidden, whom even my parents worshipped in spirit and in truth. . . ."

Thus the soul of the child is made accessible to the great revelations of the religious tradition, provided they are not made prematurely, by the very love that he has for his parents. He adopts the God of his gods.

If we seek to set in their proper place the

[1] Tolstoi, *My Childhood and Boyhood* (London, Methuen & Co.), p. 67.

parts played by religious tradition in the soul of the child, passing from the examples of worship set by a father or mother to the theological instruction they give their children, we encounter a fresh problem.

> "Every child who believes in God is necessarily an idolator, or at least an anthropomorphist. The great evil of the distorted images of divinity which we may trace in the minds of children is that they last throughout life. Let us guard ourselves against telling the truth to those who are not in a state to understand it. It is claimed that children of seven years of age are capable of the operations necessary for understanding the divinity: I do not grant the existence of this capacity in them even at fifteen. Whether I am wrong or right is not a matter of some article of faith, but of a simple observation in natural history." [2]

Let us make the simple observation in natural history which the passages taken from "Emile" invite us to make.

The first thing that holds our attention, in the ideas which children have of God, is not their strangeness, their insufficiency, their logical absurdity, nor their contradictory and rudimentary character. All these things characterise also the

[2] Rousseau, Emile, Book IV.

child's physics and his cosmogony.[3] What strikes us about the theology of children is that it is grotesque; possessing the qualities of a caricature. Using an expression which will be easily understood, we may say that the child's ideas about God are not so much childish as puerile.

This is because, in the great majority of cases, they are not the original product of spontaneous thought. They are the imperfect reproduction of the badly understood statements of adults. The child's own activity is here shown, not by adventurous thinking, but in defective apperception.

Let us try, without paying any attention to certain strange visual and auditory associations[4] which demand a complementary enquiry to reduce to a few main principles the traits which strike us as puerile in these representations of God.

Many reveal the character of God just as the child imagines him. We must ask permission to term "paidomorphism" what strikes us here; God being for these children not so much a man as a big infant.

Mariette (4:8) walking one day with her aunt, said to her after a moment of silence:

[3] Cf. Piaget, *La representation du monde chez l'enfant*, Paris, 1926.

[4] See Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, p. 202.

"Aunt Helen, God must be amused up in the sky. He cannot see what is beneath my hat. He can only see a big circle and two little feet."

Another child, on a very windy day: "God must find it a joke to make us hold our hats on."

Yet another child (5 years of age) on the occasion of a violent squall: "It's God's birthday and someone has given him a trumpet for a present." [5]

A little girl, addressing her father: "Would you like to be God?" "I don't know. Would you?" "Oh, yes. He has a birthday every Sunday."

When the child attributes to God those functions which he regards as characteristic of adults —work, for instance—the feelings he associates with them are always those of a child.

"God is a man who sits comfortably all day in a splendid arm-chair, who only disturbs himself in the evening to make the moon and stars go out into the sky." [6]

In Geneva, a little boy of eight years of age believes that God is a gentleman working in the sky for his master.

Further, the *idea* of God—and this is so strange a thing that it appears contradictory—

[5] This and the preceding story are taken from Clavier, p. 20.
[6] Clavier, p. 19.

presents itself altogether apart from any feeling of respect. In such cases, evidently, the idea of God, borrowed from external sources, has not yet become the object of a religious sentiment.

> A little boy told his mother that he had played a game with God and had won. Then, another Solomon, he had demanded that the loser should give him . . . wisdom!
>
> The same child declared that he had run races with God; always winning, because his rival was so old.

As the starting point of such representations we find, practically always, a word or a metaphor of an adult either interpreted wrongly or combined with matter from other sources by an extraordinarily concrete imagination. Thus, this statement of a small boy:

> "When you die, your skeleton goes to the museum, and the soul and the skin go to heaven."

or this description of the imaginings of a little girl:

> "When I was seven years of age, God was for me a very old man sitting at a huge table in a large room. This room was in the form of a rectangle carpeted with red velvet (velvet used to be very disagreeable to my sense of touch) and lighted by a lustre of gold. There

was only one window, hidden by a red curtain. There was only one door, which was behind God's chair. On the table could be seen large books, bound in grey velvet, in which God wrote notes. Sometimes he rose from his chair, walked over to the window, and stood looking out at the world and the people. When he had a great deal of work to do, as when Christmas was near, Jesus, St. Mary, St. Nicholas and three angels used to come to help him. They came through the door one after the other, went to the window, looked out at the world, and then went over to where God was to tell him what they had seen. The room where all this happened always seemed to me very quiet and full of mystery." [7]

Hymns often evoke the most unexpected representations.

"In heaven, we shall play hide-and-seek with Jesus." "What do you mean? What makes you say that?" "Well, the hymn says, 'In heavenly pastures fair, O, teach me how to seek Thee.' "

Religious imagery, too, evokes surprising representations. The representation can be so strongly associated with the idea that most extraordinary substitutions occur. This happens

[7] Clavier (p. 22) quotes an analogous description relating to John Fiske.

more particularly in the case of very young children.

A child of four years of age is asked, "Did you enjoy your walk?"

"Oh, yes, mamma, and I met the Good Shepherd. . . . Yes, it was the Good Shepherd, only it was a little calf that he was carrying." (It was the butcher's boy whom the child had seen.)

In another case of the same kind, a slater working on the church roof was taken for God himself, engaged in mending His house.

An abstract definition may be associated with a concrete representation:

A boy of four years of age informed his mother: "Mother, mother, today I saw God."

Next day, when walking with his mother, he said, "Look, mother, there is God just passing." The mother, looking, saw a lady whose face was hidden by a thick veil, and asked—"Why do you think that is God?"

"Because she can see us and we can't see her."

We may link up with these puerilities the prayers in which the power of God is brought into the narrow domain of the child's personal interests:

"Please God, make my train go, even when the dining-car is joined on to it."

Passages from the Bible are in all innocence similarly transformed. A boy of eight years of age reports a biblical incident as follows:

"Zaccheus, hurry up and come down: you will tear your trousers."

Another child hearing a saying about Jesus, which seems to indicate a preference for one disciple above another, he clearly shows that he does not approve of favouritism.

When examining these "distorted images" of divinity in the child's mind, we can scarcely avoid feeling a kind of impression of blasphemy. We understand the feeling of revolt against the religious instruction of young children by those who see in such expressions as those we have quoted the direct result of premature religious teaching.

Let us nevertheless bear in mind that the diverse types of distortion we have been considering are by no means restricted to children. Missionaries meet among primitive people traits of the same kind as those with which we have just dealt. A Basuto chief, for example, admired more than any other thing in the life of Jesus the fact that he was able to ride on an ass which had till then never carried a saddle.

Saint-Beuve speaks or the strange confusion in the mind of a nun who had not properly distinguished between *humidity* and *humility!*

These distorted apperceptions, not peculiar to the child, are not confined by him to the religious domain: verbalism is the cause of these confusions of words and verbal metaphors, and these fantastic constructions. We may convince ourselves of this by "simple observation of natural history." Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

If the theological ideas of the child are often strange and distorted, his religious experiences are, nevertheless, sometimes singularly lofty and profound.

The thought of the child and its representations are in violent contrast with those of the adult, but in religion as it is lived and experienced by the child and by the adult I am able to see nothing that separates the one from the other. In the mystical and ethical domain, it is possible to cite religious experiences of children (I use the word here in the sense in which I have used it throughout, to include the period before the onset of puberty, up to about twelve years of age) which yield nothing to the most exalted experiences of the saints. It will undoubtedly be said that such lofty experiences are exceptional in children: true, but are they not also rare in adults?

We might think in the first instance of those cases in which the family surroundings, working through precept and example, produce the effect as it were of a hot-house atmosphere and force fruits so precocious that they appear to us monstrous. Examples of this kind are met with in all religious persuasions.

The biography of Nellie Organ, "the little violet of the Holy Sacrament, who died in the odour of sanctity at the age of four years and five months," points out "her inexplicable intuitions on the subject of the real presence in the Holy Sacrament, the radiance of her face and the transformation of her normal characteristics at the moment of her communions, the appearance to her of the holy God, her gift of prayer, her long hours of devotion, her tears of love and contrition, the superhuman strength with which she endured suffering and her love of the Cross." Her biographer hopes for her beatification and mentions as other examples of childish sanctity the Blessed Françoise d'Amboise (4 years), Saint Maddalena dei Pazzi (5 years) and the Blessed Veronica Juliani (3 years).[8]

Cutton[9] quotes at length from Abbot the case of little Marion Lyle Hurd, who died at the age of four. When she was eight months

[8] F. Bernard des Ronces, *Nellie, la petite violette du Saint-Sacrement*, 15th thousand, Paris, Maison du Bon-Pasteur, 1912.
[9] Psychological Phenomena of Christianity, p. 263.

old her parents used to read little Sunday-school leaflets to her. When she died, "in every essential detail her piety was complete."

We ourselves know the parents of a little boy who died at the age of four years, who, having begun as early as Mr. and Mrs. Hurd the religious instruction of their son, relate with touching emotion the joy with which the little one sang hymns and the pleasure he manifested when his parents spoke of the prospect of celestial happiness and of the love of the Saviour.

The evidence of revivalists goes to show that children are readily accessible to a sense of sin.[10]

Although such recitals as these may give to those who read them an impression of abnormality, we ought not to ignore others of a similar kind connected with the lives of authentic great saints: Saint Teresa, for example, at the age of six, Saint Catherine of Siena at six, and Count Zinzendorf at three.

Apart from all intentional influence by adults, surroundings may favour not merely religious practice but also decisive moral crises:

When barely seven years of age, Emile Cook, "already seriously preoccupied with his salvation," formed with his brother, his sister

[10] Cf. Hammond, cited by Cutton, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

and a friend a little prayer meeting. And at nine years of age he had "arrived at the assurance of salvation." [11]

Other cases, not cited here, show that the mystical experience in its varying degrees (the feeling of communion with nature and the feeling of "presence") and the moral experience (the feeling of sin, the perception of the ideal, the feeling of helplessness and despair, conversion and joy in salvation) are frequently produced in surroundings which are not overcharged with religious influences.

The facts appear to me both numerous and well attested. When we deal with forms of piety different from our own, we are tempted to permit our judgments of value to influence our judgments of fact, and to doubt the authenticity and reality of manifestations which we personally deplore. In this we are wrong. If the possibility of religious experience in the case of children were not sufficiently proved by the facts themselves, we could establish it *a priori* by the analysis of the psychological conditions of the experiences. We may say that all the factors which concurrently operate in their production are present in the child at an early age. Let us look closer into this matter; retaining, for the

[11] E. Farjat, *Emile F. Cook: Souvenirs*, Paris, 1877, p. 57.

present, the convenient division of mystical and moral experiences.

The former are conditioned in the adult by what has been termed the "affective void,"[12] and the latter presuppose an aptitude for receiving instructions.[13] Both occur with startling vividness in those individuals whose subconscious life attains a high stage of development by means of slow germinations and sudden efflorescences. These psychological conditions are fulfilled, obviously, in the life of the child. Who, more than he, has an inner secret life of reveries [14] and of aspirations which lie beyond the control of consciousness? Who, more than he, loves; and, more important still, who more than he, suffers from the absence of the beings whom he loves? Who, more than he, is in the position of being compelled to obey or to disobey? We have here —if we take account only of the human aspect of the matter—everything essential to sublime raptures bordering on ecstasy, on the one hand; and, on the other, to fits of hopeless despair and illuminating conversions.

Some years ago, a lady of my acquaintance

[12] Cf., Flournoy, *Une mystique moderne;* Delacroix, *Etudes sur la mysticisme;* James, *Varieties of Religious Experience;* Segond, *La prière,* pp. 85–103.

[13] See note at foot of page 11.

[14] See Green, *Psychanalysis in the Classroom* (London, University of London Press, 1921: New York, Putnam), pp. 9 ff. Green, *The Daydream* (London, University of London Press, 1923).

allowed me to read a letter she had just received from her son, a ten-year-old boy who was precocious, both from the point of view of feeling and of literary expression. He spoke in striking terms of a religious experience through which he had just passed. I was greatly interested, since, knowing the family so well, I knew them to be afraid of manifestations of exalted piety rather than prejudiced in their favour. The mystical experience of the boy seemed to me to be incontestably characterised by spontaneity. I asked permission to make a copy of the letter, and reproduce part of it here:

" . . . I must tell you of a striking occurrence which is something of a miracle. It happened yesterday morning. While I was writing quietly, I suddenly felt that above me there was an immense power, and unconsciously, almost in spite of myself, I began to pray. It was the most splendid moment of my life. I saw God and I talked with Him. I was in communion with Him. I realised that if I had been dejected and ill it was because I had been unfaithful in my prayers. I told everything to God and I felt that He would help me just as certainly as if He had been before me and had said to me—'I will help you.' I rose up again completely happy. A true happiness, great and peaceful! I felt my-

self pardoned and full of courage. . . . I am now full of joy. It has been a revelation to me. I am so happy, so happy! I wish that you were here too, so that I might communicate a little of my happiness to you!"

Years passed by. Recently, I enquired discreetly what recollection the boy, now a man, had preserved of this "revelation" of his childhood. He remembered it perfectly, but it seemed to him to have no place in his present religious life. Seeing the interest I had in the event, he placed at my disposal a sort of journal he had kept for his own use at the time. I found in it not only an entry under the date of his letter to his mother which was substantially the same as the account he had given her, but also entries for the days preceding the experience which furnished as complete a psychological explanation as could be wished for of all that had taken place. The document is somewhat long, but I believe that its interest and value sufficiently excuse its presentation in full. I ought to say that the young lad (who was ten years and nine months old at the time of the experience) was at a period when his life was intense. He was easily excited and quickly tired. He felt a passionate interest in his lessons. His religious zeal took on a social aspect: he wanted to form

"a phalanx of volunteers for Christ by uniting together young men who wish to become missionaries," and wrote to a retired missionary on the subject. The boy felt for his mother an ardent and a tender love. Unfortunately, just at this time she had to leave home for a few weeks, since the children tired her so much. She returned for a single day and her little son wrote:

(Tuesday): What great joy to see mother again! It is only for a day, but it is good: it is some solace. . . . Mother is going out to pay a visit to Mme. R. I am going with her to be with her a little longer. What happiness it is to be together!

And the next day . . .

(Wednesday): How I enjoyed the day I passed with mother. What happiness it is to be together! I am going to the station with mother to see her off. What bad luck! She is already far away. How quickly it has passed. Came back sad and melancholy, thinking over all my follies. Well, never mind! I am happy enough to have seen my mother.

(Thursday): I am passing through a critical period of my life. I feel it very much, for I am not normal. I am nervous and possessed of a misplaced sensibility. I feel that

something is going to happen to me. Will it be good or bad? I know nothing about it, and yet I feel that something is preparing itself since I cannot remain as I am. How could it be otherwise when I am in the state in which I find myself? My silliness is really fantastic. Mother's departure, in place of saddening me, has stirred my heart. I dream of her night and day. It is true. This morning I knocked on her door: no reply. I looked through the keyhole: it was light. She is awake. I knock, and I hear nothing. I go away, and experience an unhappy moment as I reflect that she is not there.

(Friday): The event draws near. I feel it, but I am not afraid. It seems to me that it will be something good. I did not exaggerate when I said that I have become fantastically silly. I came back from town, and I forgot to mount my bicycle. I should have pushed it all the way to the house if a friend had not met me and asked me why I was not riding it. Things cannot go on like this. I waste time and I sometimes stay motionless before a shop after I have come out of it. I stay a long time and I think of mother, of my folly, or rather of my frivolity, and forget altogether where I am. I am an old dreamer and I am wasting my time with thoughts that are useless and unhealthy.

(Saturday): I feel more resolute and more

stable, more full of courage and hope. Did my lessons well. Am writing to mother.

(Sunday): (The "event" narrated in the letter already quoted.)

(Monday): Oh, how happy I am about yesterday's event. It is a revelation: I am truly happy. Today we went for a good walk. Did my lessons well this morning. . . . I have written to mother telling her of my revelation. What will she think of it?

Of the two types of experience which we are able to distinguish at all periods of life, those of the *affective* type—which we have called mystical—should be, theoretically, accessible to the child at an earlier age than those of the moral type.

Of these latter it might be said that they presuppose *reason,* provided that we give this venerable term its classing meaning: the faculty of conceiving the universal. It is necessary that whoever receives an instruction should understand that it is imperative once for all, that it is binding in every case where certain conditions, which the subject should be in a state to recognise, are fulfilled. To this capacity for perceiving a rule, a *law,* are linked, if not the experience of immediate obedience or disobedience, at least the characteristic sentiments of duty, of good conscience, of remorse attached to the ob-

servation of a rule, or, by way of consequence, the pains of inability to do good, of divided will, or the need of an influx of external power. All these are strictly related to and combine very intimately with the needs of the heart properly so called; since as a general rule it is the parents themselves, the objects of intense affection, who are the authors of the "instructions" which are most strongly imposed upon the child. The union of moral and religious feelings is thus naturally realised. Nevertheless, if we draw up a chronological scheme, we must admit that beyond all doubt religious experience of the mystical type antedates that of the moral type.

But we must assert that the age of reason itself —in the sense in which we have used the term —comes much earlier than Rousseau says. An old French Sunday-school hymn is nearer the truth than he:

No infant is too small . . .

Our fundamental thesis of the identity of the religious and the filial sentiment enables us to see this clearly.

On the whole, in the domain we have been surveying, the child is very near to ourselves. Long before he has come to the end of his religious instruction, we must think of him as "participating with us in divine grace." On the

other hand, in the field of ideas, are we not in every way still near to him? Between those puerile images we lately considered, and the loftiest conceptions of our most abstract philosophy, is there more than a difference of degree? Are not both "distorted images of the divine"? If the "gentleman" who walks about above in an office carpeted in red is merely made in the image of things known to the child, what more shall we say of the "Great Being," of "Substance," of "Cause," and of all the entities? Can we think otherwise but by means of our categories, and are not our conceptions, as necessarily as is the case with the child, "idolatrous" and "anthropomorphic"?

The "distorted images of the divine" which are traced in the minds of children will persist throughout life only if the teaching and example received from those who are the child's first gods make impossible their modification through the personal experience which life brings. If the remote image of the old clerk makes them incapable of recognising the indwelling friend, if the figure of the God who pets and spoils children when they ask him to do so eclipses that of the master who sets a task in life and gives the strength to attain it, then truly the result must be regarded as a "great misfortune."

CHAPTER VIII

PEDAGOGICAL COMMENTS

MAY we, at this stage of our enquiry, hazard the formulation of comments of a pedagogical character as to the lessons which educators might learn from the facts we have collected in the preceding chapters?[1]

It is in the first place necessary to bear in mind that, in the educational domain as in any other, practical inferences are dependent upon the goal and the ideal which the educator sets out to attain. All technique, all art, is inspired by an end which is, in a certain measure, foreign to the material which the technician has at his disposal. The stonecutter, having recognised the possibilities in the block of stone before him, preserves his liberty in propounding to himself the question:

Sera-t-il dieu, table ou cuvette?

[1] Maurice Vuilleumier's excellent study, *l'Instruction religieuse des catechumenes* (Revue de theologie et de philosphie, No. 2, 1913) which sets out in a very happy manner the general principles, should be mentioned in this connection; and also the earlier but still important study of O. Pfister, *Religions-paedogogisches Neuland, Eine Untersuchung über das Erlebniss- und Arbeitsprinzip*, Zurich, 1909.

Precisely the same thing is true of educators. Having studied the child, they still preserve their own proper ambitions. They are able to act upon the tendencies which they see before them in order to divert them this way or that, toward the ends which they consider best. We do not believe that a religious ideal could be wholly determined by facts of the kind that we have reviewed. We believe that it is indispensable to take such facts into consideration, but we realise that others may admit the same facts as ourselves and yet draw up rules of practice altogether different from those which we propose, simply because they have another goal in view.

1. First of all, then, we shall avoid drawing the conclusion, from the universality and spontaneity of the religious genius of the child, that we ought to leave him entirely to himself, and abstain from intervention of any kind at this stage of his development. Doubtless we should bear in mind the havoc that may be caused by untempered zeal and misdirected goodwill.

A mother who, finding her little son of five and a half years of age in the garden, busily engaged in tearing apart the fuchsia buds, asked him what he was doing, received the reply, "I am helping God to open the flowers." There are parents who, with the object of helping God

to expand the souls of their children, treat them with a similar ignorant brutality!

Let us beware, however, of concluding that, because the religious sentiment develops of itself in the child, that it develops best without any influence from outside. When Etienne Pascal, "overcome by the greatness and power of this genius," was fully convinced of the irresistible inclination of his son towards geometry, he had lessons given him. And all parents, if they are in a position to do so, act in the same way towards their children in relation to drawing and music. People everywhere recognise that the child, in proportion as he has a living interest in a certain domain, stands to gain by being placed in a position to benefit by the experiences and discoveries of those who preceded him. The child, on his part, has the right to a patrimony accumulated by humanity as result of long efforts of research, and nothing can better assist his development than contact with the great geniuses who have, before him, investigated the same problems.

What is gained by refusing assistance to the child's efforts and aspirations? In place of the splendid and beneficial influences with which he might be put into contact, he will submit himself to fortuitous influences: because his parents refuse him religious instruction, he will receive

it from educators, not chosen for him but encountered by chance. If you take precautions to shelter him from every sort of influence in this domain, you will only retard his development. The experience of Sintenis is typical.[2]

2. The possibility of a concerted education in this domain does not appear to me to be excluded by the character—which might be called instinctive—of the religious sentiment. But, at the same time, this character dictates the giving of this education in a peculiar spirit. Children, as we have already seen, are better prepared than ourselves for profound spiritual experiences: or, if different language is preferable, they are more accessible than ourselves to divine action. The greatest educators have for long recognised this: "The unconsciousness of the child is the slumber of God," said Froebel. Is it necessary to recall the eloquent words of Péguy: "It is the child who is full and the man who is empty"? Is not the saying of Christ sufficient: "Unless ye become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of Heaven"?

In the domain of religious life we are not superior to children. We, therefore, as has often been said, owe them respect; and since they also respect us, our relations with them in this field

[2] See page 72, note 5.

should be marked by a very special and fine shade of feeling. The German denotes persons of the same rank by an adjective for which our democratic tongue[3] has no precise equivalent: ebentürtig. Children are our peers, having the right to the same consideration which we demand from them. The spirit in which we address ourselves to them, the affective atmosphere with which we surround them, are not without importance for the ends we pursue.

We have noticed, because it has forced itself upon us, a difference of value between the two components of the religious sentiment which we have distinguished: just as we did in the case of the components of filial piety. "The *fear* of the Lord is the *beginning* of wisdom. . . . Perfect love casteth out fear. . . . God is love. For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father." These juxtaposed affirmations should direct our educative efforts. If it be our ambition to lead the child from Law to Grace, we shall endeavour to avoid associating in the child the religious sentiment with the idea of constraint. *Ama et fac quod vis,* said Saint Augustine. A little boy of ten gave expression to the same thought when he said to his mother: "To love you is to achieve

[3] *i.e.*, the French language.

everything, because if we loved you truly we should have no defects." And his brother, two years older, carried this experience of the filial sentiment into the domain of religious experience by adding the comment: "This is one of the world's great truths. Love is everything. Love is the basis of the Christian religion. . . . Christianity rests upon the words—God is love."

Solomon Reinach's definition of religion—"a body of scruples which inhibits the free exercise of our powers"—is absolutely inacceptable to the Christian because it is inadequate to his experience and still more to the Christian ideal. Let us inspire ourselves more resolutely through this ideal, and in our attempts at education reject the idea, which corresponds to stages either abandoned or already achieved, of "religious duties" in which the child is to be trained. Let us rather lead him in "the royal way of liberty." This implies that the educator should not seek to impose his own beliefs, or to present as obligatory the doctrines and opinions which satisfy him.

But it is worth while to insist that, above all, the educator should not attempt to present as obligatory something which he does *not* believe. We frequently meet parents who, having ceased to believe certain traditional or biblical affirmations, continue to hold that belief in them is

desirable. In their wish to secure to their children something of which they are themselves deprived, they try very hard to allow nothing of their own scepticism or their negations to appear, and to pass on to their children what they themselves received in childhood, with the same obligatory character with which it was given to them: for them this body of belief remains the correct opinion, the orthodox belief. There is here very often a form of intellectual laxity which merits no indulgence, the religious snobbishness of men who "think they ought," who fail alike in sincerity and reflection.[4] But, in other cases, the matter is profoundly pitiful: the adult feels in a confused way the value of a belief, and seeks through his own affirmation of it to assure the welfare of the child.

It is hardly necessary to say that, for the securing of this end, the method followed is absolutely inefficacious. It is hopeless, in this domain as in any other, to attempt to give others what you do not possess yourself: religious education can be given only by religious people. You will help the child much more by allowing him to see that your own thirst for truth and for justice is still unslaked, than by feigning a tranquillity which will to him seem only a restraint.

[4] We must never, never doubt
What nobody is sure about.

But all religious education, even if as free of constraint as it should be, implies some instruction in *practices*—prayer, the reading of the Bible, attendance at church, etc.; in *facts*—sacred history; and in *doctrine*—the existence of God, immortality, etc.

In each of these fields, the word of the parent or the teacher will carry considerable weight with the child. If we are anxious not to convey to him the sentiment to which religious instruction links itself, it is not enough that we should merely abstain from presenting the practices or beliefs, in which we are instructing him, as obligatory; it will be necessary that we apply ourselves to furnishing a counterpoise to the undue prestige that attaches to them, which, in consequence of our opinions and example, he himself will certainly give to them.

Otherwise, without our wishing it, the natural play of filial sentiment, allied to the religious instinct, will transform our narrations and our counsels into absolute dogmas, which may become the occasions of crises and distress.

In the matter of practice, it appears to me that we ought not to allow the child to remain ignorant that our practices are not those of the whole world: all men do not pray, and, still more important, all those who pray do not pray in the same manner: there are Catholics, there

are Mohammedans, and there are atheists. It is necessary to add that we should not present those who differ from us in their mode of worship as people deserving of reproof, or even as unfortunate beings. We tell the child our reasons for believing what we believe, and we tell him of theirs. The same should hold in the matter of doctrine: let us say that we are ignorant at the same time that we say that we believe. Before the great mysteries of the Beyond, our allusions to the solutions of ancient or oriental peoples will increase in the child's soul, not only the sense of the mysteries of life and death, but also the feeling of the value of the Christian affirmations: these are the problems before which for thousands of years man has halted—ever seeking, ever hoping.

Why should the child be led to believe that such matters are more simple than they really are?

In the treatment of sacred history, the child will be spared shocks that are often painful,[5] if the instructor takes care to narrate, at the same time, other interesting stories of events which actually occurred long ago, in which poetry and legend have become mixed with the actual relation of fact: William Tell and the Grütli,

[5] "Mother, sacred history does not seem as true as the history of France."

Clovis, the kings of Rome and the Trojan war. The atmosphere of the *Fioretti* will assist in the narration of certain miracles of the Bible, so that the childish soul is not oppressed by the marvellous.

I should be sorry if a taint of scepticism should be discovered in these suggestions of mine. It appears to me as incontestable that many of the great Christian experiences lead on to universal affirmations of a clearly defined character, which we cannot attenuate without altering them: the doctrines of original sin, of the divinity of Christ, of the universal worth of Christianity, of the sufficiency of the scriptures, are among these. It is not our business to discuss them or even to formulate them here: I have restricted myself to giving to each its traditional name. But while we admit the universal and absolute character of each of these, it is nevertheless permissible to enquire in what ways it is possible to present them to the child. Teachers of mathematics and of physics ask themselves the same question regarding propositions whose universality and necessity are not disputed.

In the interests of a religion in which love casts out fear, it appears to us that a method, inductive and empirical, taking as a point of departure concrete facts and individual values,

is much to be preferred to one which presents authoritatively in their absolute form dogmas in which are crystallised centuries of Christian experience. We ought not to say at the start to our children, as was said to our fathers: "You are incapable of any good of yourselves." We ought to leave them to discover step by step and of themselves their weakness and their helplessness. We ought not to tell them at the start of the unique place we give to Christ among men or the Bible among books. We ought to present to them, at the same time as Jesus of Nazareth, Socrates, Mohammed and the Buddha—or some of the great disciples, Saint Francis, Zwingli, Penn, Oberlin—and leave them to discover the immense distance which separates these men from their Master.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION—PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOLOGY

It is time to make an end. Let us draw our conclusions without encroaching in any way upon the domain of the philosopher or the theologian, to whom the results of this study may be of service. As a psychologist, anxious to keep his science within those limits where its methods cannot be impugned, I feel myself compelled to reply to a question which has doubtless been propounded by some of my readers.

In the preceding chapter, we have, with a practical end in view, left the domain of facts and inductions for that of judgments of value. Some will perhaps reproach us for this. The question does not arise, they will say, of communicating to the child the religious conceptions of the adult and showing him in what ways these are superior to his own: both are alike illusory, and this non-objective character is shared by all the religious "experiences" to

which such conceptions are attached. It is to this point, they will say, that we have been led by our research into the sentiments of the child. The desire to love and to adore is innate in man. To satisfy it, in spite of all the successive disillusionments which life inflects upon him, man has created in the past and continues to create in the present objects worthy of this adoration. We have here a gigantic hallucination—perhaps touching—but science can nevertheless regard it as nothing more than an error.

It is from this point of view that Jung, the illustrious rival of Freud, appears at times to look at the matter:

> "In regard to the sublimation of the incestuous libido, the belief in the religious symbol has ceased to be an ethical ideal; but it is an unconscious transformation of the incest wish into symbolic acts and symbolic concepts which cheat men, as it were, so that heaven appears to them as a father and earth as a mother and the people upon it children and brothers and sisters. Thus man can remain a child for all time and satisfy his incest wish all unawares. This state would doubtless be ideal if it were not infantile and, therefore, merely a one-sided wish, which maintains a childish attitude."
>
> " . . . But the world is not a garden of

God, of the Father, but a place of terrors. Not only is heaven no father and earth no mother and the people not brothers or sisters, but they represent hostile, destroying powers, to which we are abandoned the more surely, the more childishly and thoughtlessly we have entrusted ourselves to the so-called Fatherly hand of God." [1]

It may be that the regarding of the religious sentiment as a modification of filial love and the explanation of the perfection that man gives to the divine as the projection upon a distant object of those attributes which the child confers upon those beings whom he loves, is a fatally positivistic doctrine implying the denial of all reality to the object of adoration. We ourselves, following Flournoy, remain convinced that faith has nothing to fear from psychology. Doubtless, in the pursuit of his own aims, the psychologist is bound to apply what Flournoy called the principle of the exclusion of transcendence—even when he is dealing with the religious sentiments.

The scientist makes no attempt to reveal the

[1] Jung, *The Psychology of the Unconscious,* translation by Beatrice M. Hinkle of *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido,* London, Kegan Paul, 1919, p. 261.

Dr. Jung, in a letter which I published in the *Revue de theologie et philosophie* (No. 37, 1920), pointed out to me that my citation from his work contained an error, and further that it was taken from a chapter restricted to infantilism of sentiment and its religious function. I have altered my text in a way which satisfies Dr. Jung, but cannot feel certain that I have completely grasped his meaning.

hand of God in the mystic vision or the moral conversion, but his science does not forbid the believer to find God in everything which stirs his soul to recognition and adoration. In the Sunday-schools of which we have spoken the children sing joyously

> God has made the flowers
> With colours bright and gay.

What botanist would, in the name of his science, venture to refute this affirmation? And who would forbid a believer to praise God for his mother's love?

We cannot prevent anyone from taking the *libido* of the nursling as his starting-point for the resolution of the great metaphysical problems: the point of departure, the point of attack, may be the mental crisis of the child of five years of age. But we may also feel free and choose to take a higher starting-point, passing from the filial piety to the maternal love which engendered it, looking for the meaning of this instinct in the origin of things, and thus seeing in the facts which we have gathered together a fresh opportunity for the application of the famous saying "Thou wouldst not seek me if thou hadst not already found me."

Jung sees in the attitude of the believer who has remained a child, abandoning himself to "the

so-called Fatherly hand of God" an illusion and a danger. But the pragmatic judgment of his conclusion is not more evident than the metaphysical judgment with which he begins. If we take into account nothing beyond the immediately verifiable facts, do we not see that confidence begets confidence, and love, love? Have we not here the grounds for silencing the defiant statements of the world's sages, for fully justifying the appeal to childish confidence of Him by whom religion has been identified with filial love?

The same current of thought is to be found in the concluding pages of Charles Wagner's fine work, *Auprès du Foyer.*

> "Many of the ancient holy things murmured by God to human weakness were first heard under the humble family roof. The sweetest name which man gives to God he has culled from the lips of children. 'Abba' is one of the first cries in every language. Christ took it from the cradles and made of it an expression of an homage of tenderness and confidence, a source of consolation to man, a clear light in life's dark shadows.
>
> "He who is firmly caught in the family tie is in touch with the hidden source of things by means of intermediate channels established by the divine will. . . .

"I do not think that a father or mother could remain insensible to the absolute confidence that is shown to them by their children. . . . From whence comes to these little ones the tranquil faith they have in us? Who are we to inspire them with infinite confidence? We are single links in a chain which joins God to these dear late-comers. Their tranquillity shows that the chain holds well and the mooring is firm.

"Why then, have you no confidence yourself, you who inspire confidence? . . . Your reason has put together some fragmentary views of the world, and from them you have fashioned a tottering universe that threatens to crumble on your head. And while your son sleeps on your knee, calm as the planets in their orbits, you, his shelter, feel yourself eaten of worms. Of you two, he reasons best though he does not yet reason. Imitate him: you have the right to do so. What you are for him, another is for you. Since he calls you 'Father,' learn his language, look higher, and, enveloping yourself in the confidence inspired by you, mount towards the source from which it emanates, and do not fear, despite the darkness, to cry in your turn: 'Father!' "

We do not believe that it is the duty of psychology to decide whether it is reasoned fear or instinctive confidence which will penetrate more

deeply into the mystery of the universe. The researches indicated in this little book do not lead to any metaphysical conclusion. In all modesty, and with the single aim of making my meaning clear, I should be tempted to compare the result with that of the Kantian critique. In terms of the latter, space and time seem to be so completely inseparable from all sensible intuition, that nothing is gained by asserting that the representation of the universe given us by our senses is illusory. In the same way, the religious sentiment, prolonging the filial sentiment, is ineradicably anchored in the human soul. A complete review of the rites and myths of all the people of the earth could only proclaim its universality: it is an empirical necessity.

The psychologist cannot say more than this. The object of the sentiments he studies eludes his analysis: psychology is not theology.

RESPECT: AN ESSAY IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

RESPECT: AN ESSAY IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

"RESPECT has gone"—if this be true, are we right to concern ourselves with it? And if we think that the passing of respect should be deplored, are we reduced to watching its departure with folded arms, or can we by some means seize upon and lead back to us this sentiment? These questions are obviously of such real importance that we take the risk of submitting, in a somewhat popular form, some psychological reflections tending to a moral conclusion, originally delivered to an audience of students.[1]

We shall attempt in succession to describe respect, its origins and its effects, to indicate briefly some of the questions arising out of the subject, and without claiming completely to solve them, to justify the attitude which, morally, appears most to be commended in all the problems into which questions of respect enter.

[1] This study was delivered in the first instance on February 13th, 1913, at Neuchatel and published in the *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, No. 24 (August–October, 1917).

I

In endeavouring to describe something so well known as respect, we cannot altogether avoid the danger of formulating mere truisms.

Respect is a sentiment—a sentiment which is directed to an object; and it should be added, I think, that this object is originally a person, a definite individual. Thus, from the very first, respect is related to love: we respect and we love *someone*. Doubtless we are able to experience a sentiment of respect in relation to things; a place, an institution, a book appealing to us as venerable, so that we show by our outward bearing the respect that we feel in their presence. Analysis, however, shows that these sentiments are derived. All our affective states undergo a similar extension, in accordance with a well-known law, from what was their primal object to other objects of different kinds, whose idea or image is associated with the first. Examine thoroughly the respect which you have for ideas and for things, and you will find that its source is the respect you have or have had for a person.

St. Thomas says, in speaking of institutions: "The respect a man has for a precept develops naturally from the respect he has for the one who gives it." [2]

[2] "Ex reverentia praecipientis procedere debet reverentia praecepti." S. Theol. IIa. IIae. q.104.

Descartes says: "When pagans had veneration for the woods, the streams and the mountains, it was not in reality these lifeless things which they venerated, but the divinities whom they believed to preside over them." [3]

I believe that such analysis does not always go to the root of matters. The unconscious plays a very great part in originating all our sentiments. The birth of our respect often goes back to our earliest infancy, to a period earlier than any of which we have distinct recollections. However, research of this kind will lead us to precise results often enough to encourage us to make the generalisation I have just made: Respect is attached, in the first instance, to persons.

It is expedient to make a short digression at this point. One famous theory—that of Kant—is diametrically opposed to ours. It might be perfectly formulated by reversing the statement of Thomas Aquinas. *Ex reverentia praecepti procedere debet reverentia praecipientis,* Kant would say. If respect is a sentiment, it stands altogether apart, incapable of attainment through inclination or through fear. "It is pro-

[3] *Traité des passions, IIIe partie, art.* CLXII. . . . *De la Vénération.* "Veneration or respect is an inclination of the soul not merely to esteem the object revered, but also to submit to it with some fear in the attempt to render it friendly. Hence we have veneration only for those free agents whom we judge to be capable of benefiting or injuring us, without knowing which of the two they will do."

duced as the result of a rational concept. It is directed to something which cannot be considered as an object of inclination or of fear, even though it may have some analogy with these two sentiments. The unique object of respect is law. . . . The respect that we have for a person is in reality respect for the law (integrity, etc.) of which this person gives us an example." [4]

I have attempted to show the psychological insufficiency of this doctrine.[5] To such of my readers as may be Kantians I would suggest a mental reservation which will permit them to continue reading with an unbiassed mind. Kant names the respect for the moral law *Achtung*: the respect for persons, of which I am speaking here, is termed *Ehrfurcht* in the dictionaries. If the two, as is possible, were quite different sentiments, it would be possible at the same time to believe Kantian orthodoxy and psychological truth. This, however, is not my own opinion.

A third statement will complete our description of respect by making clear the effects of the sentiment. Respect inhibits—restrains—the activity of him who feels it. It is not, in itself, dynamogenous, like joy. It is not explosive, like anger. It much more nearly approaches, from this point of view, fear or melancholy.

This fact emerges very clearly when we study

[4] *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten.*
[5] See the study referred to earlier, p. 11.

the mode of expression of the sentiment. Particularly instructive is the child's way of showing spontaneous respect: the outward signs are easily taken for those of astonishment—silence, immobility, gaping mouth. Of significance also are the attitudes of respect demanded in the various social groups and civilisations; since, however conventional they may be in fact, they are but exaggerations of instinctive expressions. See, for example, the soldier standing at attention. The perfect silence, the immobility which practice has perfected, speak for themselves: the inferior, the respectful person, does not display any spontaneous activity—he has yielded his power of action into the hands of his superior.

In the widely varied activities through which respect is expressed, anthropologists have discovered "survivals" of more complex rituals, possessed of the same significance. The inclination of the head is a residuum of the prostration through which the individual surrendered his powers of initiative or resistance. The raising of the right arm, we are told, is a way of informing the person saluted that the other carries no dangerous weapon. Whatever may be the accuracy of detail involved in these interpretations, the general sense of "marks of respect" seems evident.

We thus arrive at a provisional description:

Respect is—originally—a disposition of an affective order which includes the presence (or the thought) of a definite person. Its effect is that of inhibiting, or suspending, all modes of activity which are not, or have not been, suggested by the object of our respect.

Let us discuss further the origin of respect, before attempting to appreciate its effects or to form an opinion of its worth.

It has not a single, unique origin. The persons whom we respect, whose presence, without resentment on our part and even without our taking any exact account of it, inhibits our activity—these persons are of two kinds: those whom we love and those whom we fear, and very often those for whom we feel simultaneously both love and fear. Totally different as they are, love and fear blend and are perfectly reconciled in the domain of respect, and their effects coincide.

We might illustrate this by the scrutiny of individual cases. We prefer to refer to two distinct types of experience which have been continuous throughout the ages: those of educators and those of religious people.

First, the great educators. We might call upon them for a great deal of evidence, but will restrict ourselves to the citation of a little known page of Rollin:

"Respect, on which is based that authority of which I have just spoken, implies two things, fear and love, which lend each other mutual assistance, and which are two great motives of activity, two great springs of all government in general and particularly of the conduct of children. As they are at an age when reason is not yet strongly developed, there is a need that fear should sometimes come to its aid and should take its place. But if fear acts alone, without the attraction of closely following pleasure, it is not heeded for long, and lessons produce only a passing effect, which disappears very quickly with the hope of freedom from punishment. From which it follows that in matters of education, success consists in joining to a wise disposition a forcefulness that holds children firmly without repelling them, and a sweetness that wins them without softening them—*Sit rigor, sed non exasperans: sit amor, sed non emolliens.* On the one hand, the sweetness of the master relieves the necessity that he should be hard and austere, and softens its point: *"hebetat aciem imperii"* is a fine thought from Seneca. On the other hand, prudent severity arrests the lightness and inconstancy of an age too little susceptible to reflection and incapable of government by its own efforts. This happy blending of sweetness and severity, of love and fear, then, secures for the master that authority,

which is the soul of government, and inspires in his pupils respect, which is the good element in obedience and submission: so that he would rule in all ways must choose the better part—that is, sweetness and love." [6]

Religion, where our sentiment holds as important a place as in education, shows us equally well at the roots of respect the same two forces: *Amor* and *Timor*. For M. Salomon Reinach religion is "a body of scruples which inhibits the free exercise of our powers." On every occasion when these scruples may be associated with the thought of a personal being we may speak of religion as a body of respects. M. Loisy, who has well remarked that the formula of *Orpheus,* though exact, was doubtless inadequate, has done precisely this:

"The sacred is the religious, but the religious in so far as it separates, even so far as it forbids. The notion of what is religious is not, in the main, negative. It is the expression of a reality or a quality which is superior, and as such is worthy of respect; and though there enters into respect a kind of fear, it does not by any means follow that this respect is uniquely made up of fear. It is, at the same time, made up of profound sympathy and frank admiration, though, when it occurs

[6] *De la manière d'enseigner,* L.VI, Pt. I, art. IV.

among primitive people, the various shades of this sentiment may not be very delicate. Thus the word 'respect' is that which best explains and interprets the characteristic sentiment of religion. It goes without saying that the forms and degrees of respect are as infinitely varied as is its moral value.

"But it may be affirmed without any suspicion of paradox or fantasy that every variety of respect is in some way based upon religion, that is to say, upon some mystico-moral consideration of its object; and that, reciprocally, everything that is religious, all that has a mystico-moral worth, commands respect. . . .

"Thus religion belongs to the mystico-moral order which characterises respect: it might be said that it is this very order." [7]

The author of *Orpheus* has been blamed for having traced back all the religious cults to taboos based on fear, in spite of the fact that the higher religions have developed from love. This is true, but the role of respect in the religious experience of mankind is not markedly affected by this criticism.

"Perfect love casteth out fear," says the apostle.[8] But it is necessary to realise that, if love be less than perfect, it admits and implies fear. The mystics boast, as of an experience al-

[7] Loisy, *La religion*, Paris, 1917, pp. 53–54.
[8] I. John, IV, 18.

together remarkable and as a rare mark of favour, of those moments when their love of God has realised itself in a union so complete that all trace of fear has vanished. But, apart from this, is not an invariable characteristic of love the fear of displeasing the loved one? Our everyday religion is surrounded with an atmosphere of respect, and any departure from respect disconcerts us.

I know a little boy who laughed when saying his prayers. His mother reproached him: "You ought not to laugh, my child, when you are speaking to God." "Why not?" asked the child, with perfect sincerity. What reply could be given? "Become," said Christ, "as little children."

In all creeds, souls attain to this ideal of love. *Ama et fac quod vis.* "Franciscan piety," a Franciscan tells us,[9] "constantly grows, finding that love is never enough loved. . . . In general in this discipline souls are little given to examinations of conscience, and when they make them on account of duty, they acquit themselves rather badly. . . ." Such lives, or such moments of communion with the Heavenly Father, seem to be the final achievement and goal of all religious and Christian progress.

[9] Le P. Ubald d'Alencon, *L'ame franciscaine. .Revue de philosophie*, 1913, p. 286.

Though it is doubtless impossible to give a rigorous definition of religion framed in terms of respect, the place occupied by this sentiment in the religious experience of men confirms in the most striking way what we otherwise know of its double origin in fear and in love. How, then, are we to explain this equivalence of love and fear?

A contemporary school of psychology—that of Freud—gives us biological reasons for it: fear and love are two forms, differentiated at a very early stage of development, of a single sentiment. Early in life the "affections" of the little child are tinged with two complementary hues; fear expressing naturally the relation to the father, and love, the full development of which will only be achieved later, characterises contacts with the mother. These primitive sentiments are moreover, in the course of life, transferred, on account of associations of ideas of the most varied kind to other objects, dreaded or sought after.

To examine a theory which includes so much would take us too far from our present course. Without actually setting it aside, we must make a more simple formula suffice for our actual need. In love and in fear we may discern a common element—admiration.

It is interesting to find Descartes and Pascal

at one on this point.[10] "The movement of the spirit," says the former, "which excites this passion"—respect—"is composed of that which excites admiration, and of that which excites fear." [11]

And Pascal: "The first effect of love is to inspire a great respect, and a man venerates that which he loves. And he is right in doing so: he can find nothing in the world so great as that." [12]

We may admit without difficulty this common element of admiration, for it will be understood that we, like Pascal, have not included under the term "love" all that goes by this name in romantic literature. When love is made up entirely of desire and implies no admiration, it imposes no reserve. At the same time, without insisting too much upon distinctions of words to which this age pays less attention than did that of Descartes and Spinoza, it may be well to point out that *dread* is not identical with *fear*. A furious madman who threatens me or an animal which hurls itself upon me, does not leave in me the power, whilst I am under the domination of fear, of admiring his strength. In dread,

[10] St. Thomas also: "Honor, qui est quaedam recognitio excellentiae alicuius." *Op. cit.*, q. 102, art. 2.

[11] *Loc. cit.*

[12] *Discours sur les passions de l'amour.* Petite éd. Brunschvicg, p. 132. Farther on, we read: "Reason and love should be so well proportioned that they support each other without respect stifling love."

whose object is farther away, there is always a place for certain ideas of value.

At the origins of this inhibitory sentiment, respect, we thus discover another sentiment of a more primitive kind: an admiration felt for someone who is either loved or dreaded.

If we are to arrive at an opinion regarding the value of respect, it is evidently necessary to consider its effects. Let us first consider its effects upon individuals.

Some of these are obviously troublesome. William James, in his "Principles of Psychology," [13] relates a story taken from Huxley. A discharged veteran was one day carrying home his dinner, when a practical joker in the street suddenly shouted "Attention!" At once the old soldier's hands fell to his side, and mutton and potatoes dropped in the gutter. The habit of respect can play such tricks as this! The incident which for several years made the name of Köpenick famous is another typical case.

And, it should be noted, it is not always the person who is paralysed by respect who has to bear the frequently annoying consequences of the inhibition: the person he respects may have to suffer also. J. J. Rousseau's story is well know:

[13] Vol. 1, p. 120.

One day we walked along the Isère, in a place full of prickly willows. I saw on these bushes ripe fruits. I had the curiosity to taste them, and finding the slightly harsh flavour very agreeable, I ate the tiny berries to refresh myself; Sieur Bovier meanwhile standing at my side without following my example or making any comment. One of his friends came up and, seeing me nibbling at the berries, said to me, "What are you doing, sir? Do you not know that these fruits are poisonous?" "Poisonous?" cried I, in surprise. "Undoubtedly," replied he, "and everybody knows it so well that people in these parts are careful never to taste them." I looked at Sieur Bovier and said to him, "Why did you not warn me?" "Oh, sir," he replied in a respectful tone, "I would not dare to take such a liberty." [14]

In view of such happenings we cannot feel surprise that the great enemy of respect and of the inhibitions rooted in the individual by usage and tradition is reason: utilitarian reason in particular. Xenophon has finely reported the conversations in which Socrates showed to young men the duty of being grateful to their parents: yet in teaching them that "the good is the useful," in submitting to the critique of his rationalism the usages and traditions of Athens, he

[14] *Les reveries du promeneur solitaire.* VIIe Promenade.

destroyed in his followers the foundations of respect for all that middle-class Athenians considered respectable. And, in this particular, his work was in agreement with that of the sophists.[15]

Those ages in which men reason a great deal or in which they are greatly preoccupied with questions of utility are those in which, *par excellence,* the older people are wont to declare that respect has ceased to exist.

And this consideration leads us to consider the effects of respect, not upon this individual or that, as we have been doing; but upon the society to which the individual belongs—the small and the great society, the family and the state.

The social effect of respect is essentially to ensure continuity. In the family, it submits the young to the old. In the state, it is hostile to abrupt revolutionary changes. In the words of an epigram which is much more profound than is obvious on superficial examination, respect "does not wish for more changes than those which have always existed." Every society is interested in respect: primitive tribes ensure it by initiation ceremonies, the church by religious instruction, and democratic republics by com-

[15] It is true that another part of his life work, devoted to the search for truth, established in his followers a new respect—for freedom of thought. We shall return to this point.

pulsory free education. To the state—which is indeed both judge and party—social continuity appears indispensable and respect acquires in its eyes an exceptional dignity, precisely on account of these social effects. Even states founded, like the Switzerland of Waldstätten or the French republic, in consequence of revolutions which were hardly respectful, are compelled to extol respect; and anarchists and others who seek to bring about social change through violence do not stand more highly in public opinion in these states than elsewhere. The whole of "civilisation," to make use of a convenient term, is interested in respect. "Without veneration," wrote Auguste Comte, "it is impossible to learn anything or taste anything, or to reach any fixed state of the mind or of the heart, not only in morals or sociology but also in geometry or arithmetic." [16] But the question arises as to what is the worth of this social continuity, and, equally, what is the worth of this respect which ensures it.

Why, in the family, should the young be restrained by the old; expected to yield to them, and even to sacrifice themselves to them?

In the fable of the old man and his son who took the ass to market, it will be remembered that the peasant girls expressed their indignation

[16] Letter to Dix-Hutton (1855).

when the old man rode in comfort on the beast, whilst his son plodded on foot.[17] The way in which these girls thought at sight of the stripling is comparable to that in which mothers feel in presence of their children. Is it necessary to recall "La course au flambeau" or the articles published not long ago under the title: Sa Majesté l'Enfant"? [18]

In the Church—in all churches—the problem is from time to time singularly disturbing. Ought Fogazzaro, Father Lagrange and so many others to be praised for the respect of which they gave full proof?

Within the state there have always been individuals who have objected to the right which the state arrogates to itself of demanding for itself an unconditioned respect. Unless there were individual revolts against the old order of things, how could we possibly hope for any progress whatever in the social body?

II

We are thus forced to judgments of value which we canot make without upsetting to some

[17] L'enfant met pied à terre, et puis le vieillard monte;
Quand, trois filles passant, l'une dit: C'est grand'honte
Qú'il faille voir clocher ainsi ce jeune fils,
Tandis que ce nigaud, comme un évêque assis,
Fait le veau sur son âne et pense être bien sage.

[18] This phrase is well-known in Great Britain as the title of a popular print.

extent our conceptions of life and of the world. In whichever direction we look, we see two alternative courses presented to us. We must choose, by an act of will, or on the ground of preferences less rational than instinctive, for or against social continuity.

Thus we decide against respect or for it, according as we are rationalists or not. If the whole of human conduct could and should be submitted to the control of reason, respect and the irrational inhibitions it implies would not enter into the scheme of our moral life. A Spinoza, for instance, cannot speak highly of respect; any more than of pity, of repentance or of any other "affection." He must condemn it; perhaps mitigating his judgment on account of extenuating circumstances. Connecting respect with humility and repentance, he writes:

> "Only rarely do men live according to the principles of reason . . . if they must sin, it is better to sin in this sense. If men who are feeble of soul were also all proud, they would be ashamed of nothing. The vulgar man is appalling when he is without fear. . . ." [19]

If, on the other hand, we are not rationalists —if, contrary to Socrates and to Descartes, we hold that reason cannot serve us as the sole or

[19] Spinoza, Eth., IV. Th. LIV, sch.

supreme guide in matters of conduct, if the recourse to profound intuitions appeals more strongly to us, the universal sentiment of respect will without difficulty appear right in our eyes.

This problem of moral value presents itself still more forcibly when it becomes a particular instance of the greater conflict between individual and social morals. Is my own good, or the good of all, the good that it is my mission in life to pursue?

> "It is not surprising," Spinoza again remarks, "that the prophets who have been most anxious, not for the good of a particular individual but for the good of all, have always recommended humility, repentance and respect." [20]

In spite of certain immediate appearances to the contrary, we feel certain that the most iconoclastic political sects in the states of today would tomorrow, if in power, prove the most uncompromising of people on the question of respect.

On the other hand, those who feel sympathy for a Max Stirner or a Nietzsche in their splendid isolation, will hold very cheaply both social continuity and the sentiment which ensures it.

And we might take into account, to close this part of our discussion, the cosmic epic as we pic-

[20] Ibid.

ture it to ourselves. Are we men of godlike descent? Do we believe that an age of gold has been followed in turn by an age of silver, an age of bronze and an age of iron? According to this view, those things are most worthy of respect which are nearest in time to those mighty men of former days. If degeneration is a law, those men who lived earlier than ourselves and felt its burden less are our betters. Let us, then, respect the ancients!

Does the myth of progress, on the other hand, appeal to us? We shall then say with Pascal:

> "The whole sequence of mankind through the ages should be thought of as a single man, living always and learning continually: from which it may be seen with what injustice we respect antiquity in the persons of its philosophers." [21]

Thus this question of the moral value of respect permeates the whole of philosophy.

It may be suggested that we should evade the effort of thought and the making of a desperate choice by taking refuge in revelation. This is useless. A spiritual authority could not possibly support mechanism at the expense of reflection.

Further, St. Paul had doubtless the commandment of the decalogue in mind, "Honour thy

[21] Pascal, *op. Cit.* (p. 80 of edition referred to).

Father and thy Mother," developing it in a fashion which makes it command respect for all established authority: "Fear God, honour the king." Jesus Himself declared that he had come not to abolish the law, but to fulfil it: social continuity and respect appear to be fully countenanced by His authority.

But how can we fail to take into account, as well as the fifth commandment of Moses (*"Honour* thy father and thy mother"), this other saying, so characteristic of the manner of Jesus, and so revolutionary: "If any man come to me, and *hate* not his father and mother . . . he cannot be my disciple." [22]

Whom are we to believe? What are we to do?

III

It seems to me that with the last words I have quoted, a great light dawns. They call our attention to the fact which we have not yet considered, that different respects may be rivals of each other and mutually exclusive. Respect for Christ may cause a man to fail to respect his father: respect for his father may cause him to fail to respect Christ.

If respect, as I believe, develops from love on the one hand and fear on the other, we shall

[22] St. Luke, XIV, 26.

never be altogether free from it. The knight who has never known fear and the man who has never loved exist only in the realm of fiction. Not to know respect would necessitate never having felt anyone above oneself and to have loved only oneself: to be the perfect example of pride and of egoism. I believe that Nietzsche dreamed of such a man—but that, too, is a fiction altogether alien from humanity.

We cannot escape respect—but there is respect and respect. We, who are neither supermen nor heroes of fairy tales, can be sure, not merely that certain respects will impose themselves upon us, but also that a number of different respects will be in conflict within us. Interests and values, physiological, biological, psychological, social, spiritual, will not always be in harmony in the disordered universe of men. To reach the maximum of physical strength, it is necessary to lead another sort of life than that required to attain encyclopaedic knowledge, a colossal fortune or a triumph of virtuosity.

Thus, our admiration—above all that involuntary admiration which creates respect [23]—is given at the same time to very different persons

[23] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, q. 81, art. 2: Revereri est actus timoris, qui est donum." *Donum* in opposition to *virtus* signifies a disposition of the spirit which is without merit, in which the man is passive.

who demand from us forms of respect which are frequently contradictory.[24]

It is essential to see clearly into our respects. All of them restrain us, though not all in the same fashion. Those which are born of fear paralyse us without affording us any compensation for the arrest of our activity. Love, on the contrary, while it inhibits us in one way, stimulates us in another. It does not merely hold us back from giving pain to the object of our love, but it incites us to give pleasure; thus giving birth to more activity than it suppresses.

We may therefore without equivocation speak of the respect which children have or should have for their parents, just as we may—like Juvenal—speak of the respect which parents have or should have for their children. The effects are comparable. Children are restrained by their parents just as parents are restrained by their children: certain things must not be done in their presence, certain words must not be spoken before them, out of respect for them.

A distinction between respect which is bad and respect which is good manifests itself, in the two cases, in virtue of a single principle. If we are restrained by fear, fear of protestations,

[24] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, q. 104: "Reverentia directe respicit personam excellentem et ideo secundum diversam rationem excellentiae diversas species habet."

fear of "scenes," our respect for the child is worthless: and the respect he may show for us on similar grounds is no better. If we are restrained by the love we bear our children for what is best in them, our respect elevates and enriches us—and the same thing is true of them.

Thus, for my own part, I can see no other solution of the moral problem of respect than the following. We will admit that we respect something or somebody. We will not claim that we have neither God nor master. But we will compel ourselves to see clearly the grounds of our respect; criticising it in order to establish in ourselves standards of value, and ranking our respects in accordance with these. When the question of respect presents itself to us, we will survey critically our sentiments, instinctive or habitual, in the name of our ideal; asking ourselves what it is that we respect in the object of our respect, and repudiating the lower forms of respect.

But rather than prolong this analysis, let us illustrate our meaning from the pages of an old book containing the "Golden Legend":

> Christopher was a Canaanite by descent, and was of great stature and formidable appearance. And, as it is told in other stories, when he was with the king of the Canaanites,

the thought came to him to seek out the greatest lord in the world, to dwell with him and to render him obedience. So he came to a very great king of whom general report said that he was the greatest king in the world, who received him gladly and made him remain with him at his court. In time it happened that a minstrel sang before the king a song in which the devil was often mentioned. When the king heard the name of the devil he made the sign of the cross. And Christopher, seeing him do this, wondered what this sign could be and why the king made it, and asked him: and, because the king was unwilling to tell him, he said: "If you do not tell me, I will not remain with you." Then the king said: "Every time I hear the devil named I think that he may gain power over me and trouble me, and I make this sign." And Christopher said, "If you think the devil able to trouble you, then he is greater and more powerful than you, and I am disappointed of my hope that I was serving the most powerful and the greatest lord in the world: but commend yourself to God, since I will seek my lord that I may be his servant." Thus he left the king and set out to seek the devil. And so as he journeyed through a great desert he saw a large company of knights, of whom a cruel and terrible knight asked him where he went. And Christopher

replied to him: "I go to seek my lord the devil that he may be my lord and master." And the devil said to him: "I am he whom you seek." Then was Christopher joyful and bound himself to serve him for ever and took him to be his master. Then as they went along a great high road, they met with an erect cross. As soon as the devil saw this cross he was terrified and fled, and left the road and led Christopher into a cruel desert. But after they had passed the cross, he led him again into the good road.

And when Christopher saw this, he wondered at it and asked the devil why he feared so much that he had left the open road for a bitter desert; and he was unwilling in any wise to speak of it. Then Christopher said to him: "If you will not tell me, I will separate myself from you at once." And the devil was constrained by him and told him: "A man who is called Christ was hung on the cross and when I see his sign I fear greatly and flee." Then Christopher replied: "Then he is a more powerful and a greater lord than you, since you fear his sign, and I work in vain, since I have not yet found the greatest lord in the world. Go then, for I wish to leave you and seek this Christ."

I do not want to take advantage of the winning beauty of this old story as an excuse for

neglecting to arrive at a conclusion. Poetry reinforces profound truth: nevertheless it may be useful, when we are attempting to think in clear terms, to translate symbols which have charmed and moved us.

This is what the story of St. Christopher teaches me:

We may criticise the respect we feel, for all felt respect has, in greater or less degree, our intellectual acquiescence. But, in criticising a respect, we discover at once a still greater respect in which we acquiesce. Our life is not worth living, it is worthless to others, it cannot bear for us any blessing (as we learn from the end of Christopher's story), unless it is directed by a sentiment which we are powerless to discuss—by what I should call an "ultimate respect."

This ultimate respect—to return once more to academic language—necessarily inhibits in us a great many instincts and appetites which are incompatible with itself, but it is nevertheless *par excellence* the dynamogenous sentiment, giving us the power to cross the swollen river with the world upon our shoulders; for this respect can be based only upon love.

I do not intend to go farther. The merely psychological fashion in which I have thought

out the matter does not demand that I should do so. But it is perhaps permissible to allude to the termination of the "quest of Christopher" and that of several of our contemporaries who sought, like him, "the greatest lord in the world," who might be made the object of unconditioned respect.

When they have found this supreme ideal—Beauty, Truth, Justice or Love—when, divining from the sentiments of their hearts that they have met with something more than an idea, a person, they have asked his name—several of our contemporaries have, to their great surprise, heard the same reply as the good giant of olden days:—"Christopher, be not astonished. . . . I am Christ, your Lord, whom you serve in this work."

The application of this truth to our personal life is so obvious that there is hardly any need to state it.

If this problem of respect troubles us, let us think of those who will come after us and who will encounter the problem of respect by us. For if we have all felt respect, we shall also all inspire it. There is not amongst us anyone so paltry, so little lovable that he inspires respect in none. Whatever we may be, there are about us little ones who look up to us.

For the sake of these little ones, let us give

ourselves to the service of a great ideal. Let us respect something and someone whom they may be able, after us, to respect. So that the respect with which we inspire them may not imply a thwarting of that which they will in turn feel for an unconditioned ideal, but on the contrary help them to follow it, let us ourselves be so respectful to that which is above all worthy of respect, that our children may never have to hate us in order to become the followers of the Master whom they will choose.

SPIRITUAL UNITY:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

SPIRITUAL UNITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY[1]

FROM the men whom you have invited here to address you, you have, very rightly, above all demanded facts. My colleagues have spoken to you and will speak to you of history: the history of today, yesterday and tomorrow. To me has fallen the task, very honourable though perhaps a little dull, of inducing from the facts that interest you the laws which we may be able to abstract from them, for the benefit of those who look upon the formulation of such laws as the proper object of psychological study.

Unity of spirit—communion—is not merely an ecclesiastical notion. It is, above all, in individuals, a fact of conscience, an experience towards which they aspire and which in the end they realise in their lives.

[1] A lecture delivered at the Conference of the Swiss Students' Christian Union at Bercher, in 1919, and first published in the report of the proceedings of the conference (*Vers l'Unité:* Lausanne, 1920) together with noteworthy studies by MM. Ad. Keller, J. Siordet, René Guisan and Wilfred Monod.

This aspiration, this need, is not restricted to Christians or to adept followers of traditional and positive religions. It is enough, at this point, to realise how widely spread is the need of communion by recalling with what emphasis the poets have always bewailed their spiritual isolation and the echoes which their plaints have awakened in others.

To the stars I said one night:—
"Sad, O stars, to me you seem:
In the vault of night you gleam
Sorrowing, without delight.

"You, the first gods men have known,
First of all created things—
You—with tears! What sadness brings
Tears to you?" . . . "We are alone.

"Each of us is far away
From the star you deem so near:
None of all her sisters dear
Witnesses her lovely ray.

"Black indifference round us rolls,
And our secrets die unread."
Then—"I understand," I said,
"You are like our human souls!

"Each, like you, emits her light
Far from kindred of her own:
And immortal souls, alone,
Burn in silence through the night." [2]

I

The distressful aspiration of souls towards a profound unity, the satisfaction of this craving through communion accompanied by an intense and specific joy: here are two states of consciousness as closely linked together as hunger and its appeasement, indicating to us that our business is with something of the order of *instinct* and still more definitely with those structures for

[2] Aux étoiles j'ai dit un soir:
"Vous ne paraissez pas heureuses;
Vos lueurs, dans l'infini noir,
Ont des tendresses douloureuses;

Vous les étoiles, les aïeules
Des créatures et des dieux,
Vous avez des pleurs dans les yeux . . ."
Elles m'ont dit: "Nous sommes seules. . . .

Chacune de nous est très loin
Des soeurs dont tu la crois voisine;
Sa clarté caressante et fine
Dans sa patrie est sans témoin;

Et l'intime ardeur de nos flammes
Expire aux cieux indifférents."
Je leur ai dit: "Je vous comprends!
Car vous ressemblez à des âmes:

Ainsi que vous, chacune luit
Loin des soeurs qui semblent près d'elle,
Et la solitaire immortelle
Brûle en silence dans la nuit."

Sully Prudhomme.

which contemporary psychology reserves the specific name of appetites.[3]

Which of the two psychological facts, desire and its fulfillment, is first in order? It matters little. The joy that is experienced creates the desire whose final cause it is: the desire urges towards the satisfaction.

The psychological study we are about to undertake divides itself into three parts. We shall first seek a statement of the nature of spiritual unity. We shall next examine the conditions under which it may exist. Finally, we shall try to see how our subject is related to that which at present occupies the leading place in your preoccupations—the Christian church.

First, then, what is spiritual unity?

What purpose would be achieved by attempting to describe this state of consciousness? If the psychologist claims the right to regard the objects of his investigations as being as real as those of the biologist and the sociologist, he is nevertheless constrained to realise that it is radically impossible for him to show these objects to others. He cannot describe to others the sensation of red, the feeling of fear, nor an occasional conviction felt that some objects seen by him for the first time have been already seen by him in the past.[4] To those who have never ex-

[3] Drever, *Instinct in Man* (Cambridge, The University Press).
[4] "La conviction du déjà vu," in original (p. 150).

perienced the delights of spiritual communion, my descriptions would be meaningless: for those who know them, the little I have said will be sufficient to evoke them.

In order to understand precisely of what it is that we are speaking, let us attempt, in place of a useless description, a delimitation; comparing the quest of spiritual communion with other aspirations to which it is apparently related and from which it is to some extent derived.

The need of spiritual unity is linked to two tendencies, both deeply rooted. One of these is the social instinct: the other is the need of love. Let us look into the forms in which the social instinct manifests itself at different levels.

We meet, in the first instance, with the instinctive, quasi-physiological need of *society,* the gregarious instinct characteristic of many animal species, the members of which are happy only when they are with the group. Galton speaks of the "mental agony" of the Damaraland ox separated from the herd.[5] The gain to these animals of uniting together for purposes of successful attack, as in the case of wolves, or for defence, as with the ruminants, is obvious; and we can understand why nature should have, in their case, linked a specific pleasure to the gre-

[5] Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty,* Everyman Edition, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., London, J. M. Dent & Sons, p. 49.

garious state.[6] Man also is a social animal: like the dog,[7] he finds pleasure in the warmth of the company of others. We love to feel ourselves shoulder to shoulder with others, to push ourselves into a crowd of our fellows.

We are speaking only of the social instinct. It is hardly necessary to say that the recognition of a clearly defined tendency in man does not forbid us to admit in him at the same time the existence of a directly opposed tendency. While I speak of the pleasures of society, I do not fail to recognise the joys of solitude.

We may go a step farther. To the social instinct is added the tendency, also more or less unconscious and in any case irrational, to *conformity*. With the need of society we are still only on the biological plane, but the quest of conformity and the pleasure which it procures us cannot be explained without an incursion into psychology. If the ideo-motor law—we see someone yawn, and we yawn ourselves—may be held to account for the contagion of emotion and the commotion of a crowd, it is nevertheless true that the pleasure which we sometimes experience when conscious that we are at one with our surroundings presupposes judgments of value, more or less explicit. It is derived from an

[6] See McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, London, Methuen.

[7] See James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 431.

imitation which is not entirely mechanical; from an emulation, a desire to resemble something which has for us prestige or authority.

I find a good instance of this in Tolstoi's "War and Peace":

> "Berg and Vera could not restrain a joyous smile at the sight of the animation in the drawing-room, the noise of conversation, the frou-frou of dresses, the babble of greetings. Everything here was just as it was everywhere else. Old people with old people, young people with young people, the mistress at the tea-table on which were the same cakes and the same baskets as at the Panine's soirée. Everything here was absolutely just as it was everywhere else. . . . Berg was content and happy."

And William James[8] quotes this saying of "a charming woman":

> "The certainty that we are well dressed gives us a peace of heart compared to which that yielded by the consolations of religion is as nothing."

A stage further on is the quest, this time fully conscious and rational, for *harmony,* which goes with the recognition of a community of interests, a solidarity. We leave the undifferentiated

[8] James, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 431, footnote.

and sheep-like flock. The herd becomes a troop, leaders have appeared, and there is even division of labour: we find there head and members, and organs with diverse functions. Menenius Agrippa made the plebeians conscious of the bond that united them with the other inhabitants of the city. In the diversity of tasks the perception of a unity of end is a revelation of value.

But the interests of a society, like those of an individual, are of two kinds, carnal and spiritual, as Péguy would say, egoistic and ideal. At times the crises of life reveal them to us in conflict. Man has been willing to sacrifice even existence itself to truth, to justice, to love. He is willing even to die for what, at the very foundation of his being, he knows to be the true life. Otherwise, in saving his life he loses, as Juvenal says, the very reasons for living. "The beauty of life is worth more than life itself." [9]

We may find the whole of faith in God and the Beyond in this conviction, if we examine it thoroughly. "I believe in life: here or elsewhere, matters little. Nothing will die that God makes live." [10] These ideal interests, whatever value they may have for individuals, are clearly distinguished from egoistical or biolog-

[9] Henri Gounelle, see *Semeur*, May, 1919.
[10] Samuel Bourquin, *Un croisé*, p. 143.
(These citations, with others that follow, are taken from the writings of young Frenchmen, members of the Student Christian movement, who were killed during the war.)

ical interests. They are, further, something different from interests properly social, which might be called the egoistic interests of collective groups; and may on occasion enter into conflict with these also. There are cases where the individual sees placed over one another like three rungs of the ladder of Jacob, biological, social and ideal values. He then feels that, just as he ought to sacrifice his own interest to that of the community, so in turn the interest of society ought to give place to values which are "disinterested" and supreme.

An agreeable feeling of harmony accompanies the perception of community of "temporal" interests: the realisation of an analogous solidarity gives a lofty and profound joy, high above everything else—we merely state a fact without attempting here to describe it, or, for the moment, to explain it. *Spiritual communion* (it seems right to reserve this term for the state of which we are speaking) gives to man the certitude that he is bound, in the depths of his being, not merely to his fellows who share his experience, but with them to ultimate reality, and this sentiment assumes for him the form of a coefficient of infinite value: GOD is there.

It is not surprising that so lofty a state of consciousness has in all ages attracted attention.

The effects of spiritual communion upon the individual are markedly beneficial. Durkheim,

describing the annual corroborees of the Aruntas and Wanamungas, speaks of them as *roburative* in character. In their own technical language, psychologists would term them *dynamogenous.*

Let us endeavour to see the things behind the words. Let us leave the Australian aborigines to listen to some of the best of our contemporaries. I might quote many examples from the admirable *Tablettes d'Or* of the *Semeur,* in which our French comrades have so lovingly remembered those who are no more.

At the moment of departure for the front, P.-P. Kruger wrote:

> "I feel through the moments of weakness inherent in all men a great calm, a mighty calm, within me. It is not the exuberant joy which others experience in such circumstances, nor yet that happy indifference which we see in other men. It is an indefinable confidence, and this I owe largely to you, my friends, my dear friends. I do not feel myself going alone towards the unknown, which may be suffering, which may be death; but accompanied, surrounded, strengthened and consoled by the thoughts of those who are dear to me." [11]

And Alfred Eugène Casalis wrote:

[11] *Semeur,* May, 1915.

"You have no idea of the *peace* in which I am living. All those I love are near me, very near. . . . Just now we are called on active service and our service is sacred. We may be called upon to dwell in solitude: yet those who are gone will remain with us and the memory of their efforts will linger. Or they will live about us in the light that our eyes do not yet perceive, and always we shall be intimately linked together since we are one in Him—we in Him, and He in us." [12]

II

Those who have enjoyed the privilege of experiencing the immediate sweetness and the bracing effects of this spiritual communion, so exalted and so precious, have endeavoured to hold fast to it, to keep it with them in some way or to renew it at will, by discovering how it came to them. What are the conditions upon which it depends?

Replies of the most varied character have been given to this question.

Men have often seen in spiritual unity the effect of a common *emotion*. This is not surprising: the very terms we have used in the attempt to describe this state sufficiently indicate the place that sentiment occupies in it. Hence

[12] Alfred Eugène Casalis, p. 71. (See note, p. 170.)

it has been thought that the benefits of spiritual unity would be gained if it were possible to revive in common the emotions which procured them on the first occasion.

The possession of memories in common establishes a very strong bond. Our reunions of old students, men of the same public school or the same college, permit us to enjoy many delightful hours. Many are the clergy who utilise this psychological law by forming their old catechumens into societies: the faithful who have passed through the "same experiences" feel themselves closely bound together. Before Pentecost it was doubtless for the purpose of reviving old memories and talking over their recollections that the disciples gathered together in the upper room —when they broke bread together, a common feeling made their hearts burn within them. Of all the emotions, is there one which succeeds better in binding men together than the common admiration for a teacher loved by all of them?

Rites have singular virtue in fixing the emotions. Allow me to give here a personal experience. At Pontigny, in the course of one of the meetings organised by M. Paul Desjardins, I had the privilege of coming into very close touch with one of those liberal Catholics to whom we Protestants feel ourselves to be so near. He told me that the previous year, after having felt him-

self in perfect intellectual communion with an Anglican and a free-thinker, he had to his own astonishment experienced an intense joy at the realisation that the fasts of the Church created a closer solidarity than thought could accomplish. At table, one Friday, seeing a woman and her children abstain from the meat that others were eating without scruple, he realised clearly that he was much closer to these simple minds than to the wise men with whom he had been talking.

Above all, as you are aware, it has often been believed that spiritual unity depends, above all, upon community of *belief*. Throughout the ages the Church has applied itself to the task of framing symbols and cataloguing beliefs for all its members, and has tried to secure spiritual communion to all the faithful by exacting from them adherence to common beliefs. It is not difficult to see that unity thus obtained cannot be otherwise than equivocal and precarious.

Precarious:

"Divide possessions equally. This state of things will last no more than a week, because at the end of that time one man will have worked with success, another will have embarked upon a losing business, and a third will have done nothing. Arrange with a hundred

people, or ten, or even two only, to draw up a common confession of faith to be signed by all. In a short time, the spirit of one man will have worked in one way, that of another in another way, and that of still another not at all: you will no longer be in agreement. The only way of giving enduring effect to equality of possessions or to equality of beliefs would be to sleep." [13]

Equivocal also:

"All men will not have gone through the same experiences, nor will they have been subjected to the same influences. You will no more be in agreement than you have been, and if you try in spite of everything to adhere to your common confession of faith, it will be, if not altogether at the cost of straightforwardness, at least at the price of *perfect* straightforwardness, which should be the strict rule in such matters. It will be through the giving, to the same words, of a sense a little different (or very different) from that which you know others to give them, and different from that in which they were understood at the start." [14]

No, no: spiritual unity comes from still other sources than ideas and emotions.

[13] Félix Bovet, *Pensées.*
[14] Ibid.

Let us consider what Henri Lafont, one of our French comrades, writes, summing up what he experienced last summer during his stay at a camp of Christian students:

"I felt that one might have ideas different from, and even opposed to, those of other Christians, without feeling less one with them, less in communion of soul with them. It appeared to me, more luminously than ever before, that what was of importance for our salvation was *not ideas*—since I have met excellent Christians whose ideas differed totally from my own—but the *intention* which each had in forming those ideas, and the *end* he has pursued since arriving at them. There can be no possible doubt that all have in view the triumph of good over evil, of spirit over matter; and it is through this that I feel closely bound to you all." [15]

Again, from Casalis, whom we quoted a little earlier:

"It is infinitely sweet to feel that there are other souls about us and behind us, who have the same *will for the ideal,* and who follow the same Progress to the Star."

" . . . Our ideal . . . what a bridge across the distance and the doubt between our souls!"

[15] *Semeur,* January, 1919.

cries a third, Fontainevive. And from the front he writes:

> "Here in truth love is born of death. If you knew . . . what pity grips us for those poor people who have not understood that holy union is not a political truce more or less respected, but *a communion of souls tending to the same goal,* living together in common hours of anguish, of suffering, of weariness and of hope." [16]

Weigh well these last words. That souls should live together through hours of weariness and suffering does not suffice for the creation of communion between them. Anguish and despair unite only those souls which feel themselves tending to the same goal. In the common intention, the identity of orientation, are the true origins of communion of the spirit.

The very facts we have cited earlier confirm this induction, if we examine them more closely. The feelings which unite men are those which tend to a goal. We have distinguished admiration from all other sentiments: the admiration which a hero or a master inspires in us also develops an attitude, a will to follow in the footsteps of those to whom we yield ascendancy.

The rites which unite men inwardly are those

[16] *Semeur,* November, 1917.

for which some measure of opprobrium is felt, those whose determined performance is like definitely taking sides and throwing down a challenge.

The beliefs which unite men, too, are those which express a fighting attitude. It would be foolish to deny that confessions of faith, even those which appear most exclusively intellectual, have not in the past been manifestations of a deep unity. But let us look closer:

> "We have certain principles, moral, religious and political, which we rightly hold, and we know that we are glad to be strongly attached to them and even to feel passionately about them.
>
> "Yet sometimes we realise that what makes them so dear to us is that they give us the right to speak evil, with a good conscience, of people whom we do not like." [17]

It is very striking to realise that the great historical symbols have all been fashioned against someone. Arians, Manicheans, Socinians, Unitarians, Liberals . . . there was always, when unity was sought after, someone to be branded as heretical. The community of hatred, when it is not the decidedly repugnant community of a grudge, very often stimulates the need of a unity of intellectual formula. It is not chance that

[17] Félix Bovet, *Pensées.*

unites so closely, in the herd, the social with the combative instinct.

The symbols in which we seek today to give expression to the spiritual unity of the Church may still be translated, and necessarily so, in terms of this double attitude of adoration and of strife. May they all, like the admirable declaration in which, in July, 1914, the Salvation Army proclaimed its belief, direct the spiritual energies of Christians against foes more dangerous than any heretics, "injustice, unbelief, impurity, drunkenness, lying, usury and oppression"; and complete this attitude of combat with the desire to love.

Here is the declaration. It is well worth the consideration of those young people who demand that the church of tomorrow shall "know what it wants":

> We acknowledge the living God as our God,
> we submit ourselves without reserve to His authority for His service,
> and we renounce all that is contrary to His will and His good pleasure.
> We are saved by faith in the sacrifice of His Son, Jesus Christ our Lord.
> We invoke for our strength and our guidance God the Holy Spirit, and we offer ourselves, body, soul and spirit, to be His temple.
> We believe that God's grace is for all peoples,

that His salvation is offered to all men,
and that all may through Christ obtain pardon for past sins, purity of heart, separation from all evil, union and communion with God.

We believe that no man is necessarily oppressed by the devil
or condemned to a day of judgment,
or definitely lost, if he will accept the mercy of the salvation of God in its freedom and fulness.

We declare ourselves enemies of injustice, unbelief, impurity, drunkenness, lying, usury and oppression.

We believe that it is our duty to proclaim this message to the whole world,
to care for the poor and the suffering,
to visit those who are in prison,
to feed the hungry,
to clothe the naked,
to love those who are not lovable,
and to be in all countries the friends of the friendless.

We bind ourselves solemnly in the name of God,
in His strength,
and under the banner of the Salvation Army,
to do, and to suffer, all that is necessary for the realisation of these holy ends not only in our own country, but throughout the whole world.

III

We are thus led to approach more closely than we have yet done the notions of spiritual and Church unity.

There is no difficulty, it appears to me, about this, if the Church is for us, historically, the society of disciples of Jesus Christ working for the coming of the Kingdom of God. We may translate this conception into terms of ideas; defining it, as we attempted earlier, as a society looking towards an absolute and transcendent goal. This is very nearly, if I understand rightly, the meaning which Kant gives to it. From this point of view, only one Church is conceivable, since there can be in the final analysis but one ultimate and supreme ideal. Societies with limited and subordinate interests, on the contrary, are many and divided.

Let us leave the discussion of ideas. If we will but consider the facts, we shall realise at once that the opposition between the Church with its ideal goal and the societies with their interested ends is far from being absolute. States themselves, founded upon a social contract in which certain publicists claim to see only great societies for mutual help in relation to real interests—these states themselves, under the name of fatherlands, assume for a number of our contem-

poraries the functions of the Church. The sentiments inspired by them are strictly related to religious sentiments, and we do not wonder at it: the land of our fathers is also that of our sons. The interests of these societies are not only those of the adults who today take part in them, but also those of the children who will spring up tomorrow: a generation may immolate itself for the sake of those who will follow it. If this is not a religious sacrifice in view of an absolute ideal, it comes singularly near to being so. This appears in a striking fashion in those who, giving with enthusiasm their whole lives for the temporal fatherland and the eternal city, have nevertheless known how to maintain the distinction between the two in their thoughts.

Thus Jean Klingebiel wrote:

> "If I am proud of my country, it is because it is the land of just causes and because its intentions are pure. If by chance my country should forget its tradition of serving humanity and should become egoistic and brutal, perhaps I should remain a patriot, but my patriotism, ashamed of itself would seek to hide its face. Blessed be my country which allows me to cry "Vive la France!" with pride in the face of the whole world." [18]

In face of these social sentiments expanded to

[18] J. Klingebiel, *Cahiers*, p. 73.

the grandeur of religious sentiments, how many churches shrink to the proportions of egoistical societies, confounding the *Ad maiorem Dei gloriam* which is their motto and the reason for their existence with a niggardly programme of social preservation!

Even apart from national churches, how often do we not see the spiritual unity, which we have tried to describe, reduced to a mere community of interests, or even fallen into the abyss of routine conformity! Is the pleasure with which churchmen find themselves in a fine old church singing the good old psalms always psychologically different from the joy which old chums experience on finding themselves gathered together in a tavern rich in former memories?

But, if we limit ourselves so that we bring spiritual communion in relation to the social instinct only, we fail to arrive at a full knowledge of its character. Those men who are united by the same ideal endeavour to understand, to fathom each other. This has nothing to do with the social instinct of the herd, or even of a crowd. Two souls in solitude—even more a single soul in presence of the infinite, endeavours to unlock itself, to give itself, to penetrate and to be penetrated, to understand and to be understood.

Elisabeth Leseur, a Catholic married to an

unbeliever whom she loved tenderly, has expressed in a poignant way this aspect of the need of communion:

> "I love the interior solitude, alone with God. It strengthens my soul, giving back to it light and enthusiasm."

But sometimes isolation, which is different from solitude, weighs her down.

> "I thirst for sympathy, thirst to show my naked soul to other souls dear to me; to speak of God, of immortality, of the inner life, of love. But the human soul is so varied, so delicate, that one must feel its profoundest cords vibrating in unison before one can make them sound in the presence of another of these divine instruments. The complete union of two souls must be a melody full of beauty.
>
> "With the one I love best in all the world, grant, dear Lord, that I may murmur it some day." [19]

This is of the order of love.

In love achieving itself in spiritual communion, spiritual communion achieving itself in love, there is doubtless one of the loftiest experiences possible to any human being, one in which there comes to him the feeling that he has reached God.

[19] *Journal.*

It is this love, in which he sees the religious sentiment *par excellence* in the social order, that J. J. Gourd, in his admirable *Philosophie de la Religion,* distinguishes from the simple fellow-feeling which gathers together only those who are already like each other, or who seek themselves in each other.

Love has always been regarded as an essential attribute of the Church. It is not a bond which merely unites the members to each other, but one which binds the common consciousness of all to the personality of each.

Like a mother, the Church enters into and understands all who come to her; giving them food, protection, support and comfort.

There is more. This supreme ideal, of which we spoke earlier, may seem cold when looked at from without, but souls tending towards and aspiring to this goal, sharing a common enthusiasm, project into it the ardour of the feelings which animate them. What they reach out to is not a formula or a phrase, nor simply the keystone of the vaulting of a building; but a head, governing the members, a living being, to the love of whom the whole Church aspires like a bride awaiting her bridegroom. In the complete experience of spiritual unity (we have realised from the beginning), there is more than a communion of brothers: there is the real presence of Christ in His Church. All are one.

Let us come down to earth . . . and, if you will allow me, on the road that connects two of our Swiss villages, La Sarraz and Pompaples. I found myself there last summer with my boys. We stopped before a pool of calm and deep water, the myriads of molecules of which had a common origin. They had come down together from the foothills of the Jura. Together they had turned, I believe, the wheels of a mill—the Moulin Bornu; and I could have engaged my boys in thinking upon the possibility of a communion of spirit through which all these drops of water might have been made aware of their common origin and their similar experiences. In place of this we gave ourselves, on the contrary, to thinking of the instability of the motionless unity which had caught our attention. At two extremities of the pool two mouths opened, breaking for ever the ephemeral unity of the mass of water: to the right the Rhine and the North Sea, to the left the Rhone and the Mediterranean.

But I sometimes walk with my children to the Willows Lane, just outside Geneva. There we see the blue Rhone and the white Arve in striking contrast. But the two rivers flow towards the same goal, and, a few paces farther on, mix so perfectly that you could never know whether a molecule of water had come to the river from Savoy, from Léman or anywhere else.

Static communion—Dynamic communion. We know which of these is ephemeral, and which is lasting.

To us Protestants, the formula of the old Catholicism, the famous saying of St. Vincent of Leirins—*Quod semper, ubique et ad omnibus creditum est*—That which has been always and in all places believed by all men—is a chimera. But if we attempt to translate this *creditum* in the way we are beginning to understand it, by a verb which expresses not an intellectual adherence but an attitude of trust—That in which humanity has never ceased to trust—it appears to me that the ancient formula will again have profound value for us.

If we desire an ideal towards which many men may orientate themselves, let us choose a sublime one. Let us learn to regard as provisional goals, subordinate to a great ultimate end, as beacon fires lining the channel leading to some great harbour, all those things through which men have hitherto held communion with each other; though no single ideal has yet effected the complete unity of all wills and of all hearts.

And do not fear, men of little faith, that thus we shall betray the Christ whom we are ambitious of serving. Is there not incarnate in Him the realisation of all human aspiration, the travail of all creation?

THE JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU INSTITUTE AND ITS WORK

THE JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU INSTITUTE AND ITS WORK

THE translator of this book has expressed to me the opinion that some of its readers would be interested to know something of the institution in which it originated. It gives me great pleasure to make the attempt to give a brief account of the J. J. Rousseau Institute and its work.

I realise very clearly that my book "Le Sentiment Religieux" (translated as "The Child's Religion") represents only partially and imperfectly the scientific researches which are being carried on in the institution which I have the honour to direct, though it is at the same time typical from some points of view at least of the work we are trying to do. It originated at the wish of the students themselves. It is throughout inspired by the conviction that what we most need in every department of education is a deeper knowledge of the children themselves. There will be encountered in it, I trust, signs of intellectual sympathy for a number of diverse scientific methods. Could it be otherwise in a book

written by an old pupil of Ernest Murisier; by a disciple of Théodore Flournoy, the great friend of William James?

What is the J. J. Rousseau Institute, the school of educational sciences, of which I have been asked to write?

It seems in the first place advisable to say, since I am writing for readers in Anglo-saxon countries, that it is not a school intended for the propagation of any political, social or religious ideas, or even the educational doctrines of the man whose name it bears. There are people in the world whose associative processes are perhaps active beyond the ordinary, for whom Rousseau means at once the French Revolution, and the Revolution the soldiers of the Republic lighting their pipes at the candles on the altars; for whom, on this account, an institute named in honour of Rousseau is necessarily tainted with atheism and irreligion. This little book will perhaps serve to break down such associations. The book, however, was not written with such an object in view, for the aims of our school are scientific research and frank discussion. We have no desire whatsoever to indoctrinate our pupils, and we do not present to them the personal convictions of their teachers, such as those expressed in the final chapter of this book, as the data of science. From the very commence-

ment we have had amongst our most valued collaborators a number of fervent Catholics; and when we have studied the problem of religious education, we have arranged that our students should hear in succession from Catholics, members of the Greek orthodox church, Protestants, Jews, and freethinkers exactly how the bodies they severally represent would deal with the question of initiating the child into spiritual life.

Our Institute was founded in Geneva in 1912, the year in which were celebrated the second centenary of the birth of Rousseau and the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the appearance of the "Emile." Without committing ourselves to the doctrines of this celebrated book, which has had so profound an influence upon the science of the child, we have nevertheless taken as our motto a phrase (as true today as ever it was) which appears on the first page of Rousseau's work—"Begin by studying your pupils better, for assuredly you do not know them at all." We have translated this by four Latin words DISCAT A PUERO MAGISTER—illustrated by the vignette which has become the emblem of our institute: a child is shown coaxing an old teacher to turn from the dusty tomes before him, and to look out, through the widely opened window, into the clear air.

The J. J. Rousseau Institute is in the first

place a school of the sciences of education intended for those teachers and future teachers who wish to study seriously the bases of those modern reforms in education which have won recognition everywhere. The diversity of the aims of our students has forced upon a programme of the widest possible character; and has forced us, in practice, to undertake the training of directors of education, teachers in normal schools and in New Schools, inspectors and directors of primary education, teachers in special schools and in kindergartens, infant welfare workers, advisers of adolescents leaving school, works personnel selectors and industrial psychologists, as well as teachers in ordinary schools and good interested mothers. Many of our old pupils marry and become parents, without in the least regretting the time spent in learning to observe and understand children. One essential point is never forgotten in all this varied teaching and preparation for a diversity of careers: *only those who understand the child can educate him.*

The science of the child cannot be learned from books. Child psychology is still a very young science, in the making of which our students are called upon to assist.

Everything which brings our pupils into closer touch with the child is welcome to us, and

we have received with pleasure the advocates of methods of the most diverse character. Experimental psychology finds its complement with us, as with Cyril Burt, in psychoanalysis. It was at the Institute that the ideas of Coué were, for the first time, made the subject of a definite course, and the celebrated work of Baudouin was in its earliest form the collected edition of these lectures. The direct observation of children undertaken in the school itself, and especially in that world of little children which we call *La Maison des Petits,* does not include either the anthropometric measurements which Dr. Godin interprets with such sagacity, or the clinical examinations from which Piaget has obtained the materials for his astounding revelations of the ways in which children represent to themselves the world and the forces at work in it; or again, the tests of intelligence, aptitude and knowledge which Mdlle. Descoeudres has arranged in a scale for children of ages ranging from 2 to 7 years, and which Claparède has organised into "barèmes" in his work, "Comment diagnostiquer les aptitudes des écoliers."

Scientific researches, however great their interest, would of themselves keep only a very small proportion of our students with us if we did not at the same time apply ourselves to discover and make clear their practical bearing.

The students are therefore put into touch as far as possible with the actual concrete problems of life; in addition to being taught how to observe and experiment. For this purpose the services and institutions of various kinds which have been created by the Institute have the greatest possible value. There is, in the first place, *La Maison des Petits,* now taken over by the public schools of Geneva. The teachers, though profiting by the teachings of Froebel, Dewey, Montessori and Decroly, have given to the school a character entirely its own, and have in particular invented an extremely ingenious didactic apparatus. Students in the Institute who intend to become teachers of little children follow a course in this school.

Those who are interested in older children have access to the public schools of Geneva. Since 1928 the state of Geneva has entrusted to the J. J. Rousseau Institute the training of its future primary and infant school teachers in the theoretical branches of their work. At present we are looking forward to the opening, in the autumn of 1928, of the experimental school of the Department of Public Instruction of Geneva; a matter of the greatest interest to the Institute. Mdlle. Descoeudres conducts classes for those teachers who intend to specialise in the

education of retarded and defective children; teaching them methods of exact and minute observation. The Institute also collaborates with several private schools and conduct examinations of their pupils: the bilingual *Ecole internationale,* founded by officials of the League of Nations, should be mentioned particularly in this connection.

The *Consultations médico-pédagogiques,* first opened in 1912, are the equivalent of the school clinics of Anglo-saxon countries. Children are sent to them by their parents, their teachers or their friends, or come of their own accord for the most varied reasons: defects of character, fugues, thefts, lying, bad habits, insubordination, laziness, undefined mental uneasiness, difficulties of belief, backwardness at school, etc. A medical examination is followed by psychological and social studies of the case, in which the students of the Institute participate.

The *Cabinet d'Orientation Professionnelle* advises adolescents at the time of leaving school, or later, regarding the choice of a career; paying special attention to their aptitudes. Students of the Institute who intend to specialise in this field are taught how to carry out these examinations, and are also initiated into occupation analysis and technopsychology.

The *Centre d'Action en Faveur des Enfants Anormaux,* whose activities extend over the whole of French Switzerland, gives our students the opportunity of visiting numerous establishments for the protection of childhood, of making examinations and of conducting psychological investigations.

The collaboration of the Institute with the Y. M. C. A. International Institute for Physical Education should be mentioned: and also the researches undertaken by the Institute, with the assistance of the International Auxiliary Language Association on the teaching of auxiliary international languages—Esperanto in particular.

What best shows the widespread influence of the J. J. Rousseau Institute is the foundation in 1926 of the *International Education Bureau,* of which an Englishwoman, Miss Marie Butts, is the indefatigable secretary-general. Thanks to the personal links established and maintained by the Institute with its students, who occupy important educational posts in more than forty countries, the International Education Bureau has developed a number of important activites, which cannot be detailed here, but which demand separate treatment.

The international character of the Institute,

affirmed in the first year of its existence (1912) when its twenty students represented thirteen different countries, has been accentuated since Geneva has become the headquarters of the League of Nations. Its vacation courses bring together teachers drawn from six continents. At the moment of writing, twenty-five nationalities are represented by our seventy students. The most friendly relations have always existed in this microcosm, where an education in the spirit of international co-operation is given naturally and inevitably in an atmosphere of work and cheerfulness. Examinations would be foreign to this spirit. Certificates and diplomas are awarded on account of practical work done at the Institute. However, our relations with the University of Geneva being of the most friendly character, special examinations have been instituted in the University for those students who wish their work to receive official sanction. The doctorate in Philosophy (with mention of Pedagogy) is awarded, under special conditions.

This, then, is the organisation I have been invited to describe to my readers. Of the existence of gaps I am well aware. There is much, too, to which I have not called attention, since I feel that this can only be done effectively through personal contact. I shall be happy to

do this when opportunity serves, in the case of any of my readers who are sufficiently interested to wish to pay a visit to the J. J. Rousseau Institute.

INDEX

Abbot, 99
d'Alençon, 140
Archimedes, 87

Ballard, 61
Barthou, 56
Baudouin, 195
Berguer, 9
Binet-Sanglé, 13
Bourquin, 170
Bovet, Fèlix, 55, 176, 179
Bovet, Pierre, vii
Brunschvicg, 64, 142
la Bruyère, 48
Burt, Cyril, 195
Butts, 198

Casalis, 172, 177
Claparède, 195
Clavier, 93, 95
Comte, 146
Condillac, 18
Cook, Emile, 100, 101
Coué, 195
Cutton, 99

Delacroix, 102
Deonna, 84
Descartes, 133, 141, 142
Descoeudres, 195, 196
Desjardins, 174
Dos Santos, 49
Drever, 166
Dubarle, 56
Durkheim, 8, 171

d'Estrella, 64

Farjat, 101
Federn, 58
Ferrière, vii
Flournoy, 6, 15, 16, 102
Fogazzaro, 147
Fontainevive, 178
Frazer, 46, 49, 84
Freud, 15, 17, 18, 49, 141
Froebel, 113

Galton, 167
Girard, 25, 73
Godin, 195
Gosse, Edmund, 42
Gounelle, 170
Gourd, 186
Gratry, 27
Green, G. H., 102
Greig, vii
Gretillat, 44
Guex, 83

Hall, Stanley G., 14, 21
Hammond, 100
Hamon, 57
Hebbel, 37
Hinkle, 123
Hoffding, 12
Hurd, Marion, 99
Huxley, 143

James, W., 4, 6, 13, 33, 61, 63, 64, 102
Jung, 122, 123
Juvenal, 153, 170

Kant, 133, 182
Keller, Helen, 64
Klingebiel, 183
Kruger, 172

Lafont, 177
Lagrange, 147
Lamartine, 89

INDEX

Lang, Andrew, 60
Lay, 79
Leseur, 184
Littré, 3, 44
Loisy, 85, 138, 139
Lorenz, 51
Loti, 30

Maday-Henzelt, 80
Marmont, 52
Maspero, 51
McDougall, 168
Menenius Agrippa, 170
Moret, 84
Murisier, 192

Neeser, 56
Nietzsche, 149

Organ, Nellie, 99

Pascal, 27, 87, 142, 150
Pascal, Etienne, 112
Péguy, 113, 170
Pestalozzi, 23, 25
Pfister, 110
Piaget, A., 52
Piaget, Jean, 59, 79, 80, 81, 84, 92
Pieczynska, 22, 26
Plato, 54
Pratt, 92

Quenstedt, 44

Rambert, 56
Reinach, 84, 114, 138
Renan, 82
Rette, 57
Ribot, 7
Roettger, 37
Rollin, 136
de Ronces, 99
Rousseau, 40, 91, 108, 143, 192
Ruskin, 21

Saint-Beuve, 98
St. Augustine, 114
St. Catherine, 100
St. Christopher, 154
St. John, 139
St. Paul, 150
St. Theresa, 21, 72, 100
St. Thomas Aquinas, 132, 133, 142, 152, 153
St. Vincent, 188
Schlatter, 43
Schroeder, 13
von Schutz, 74
Secrétan, 16, 39
Segond, 102
Seneca, 137
Sintenis, 72
Socrates, 144, 148
Spinoza, 142, 148, 149
Stirner, 149
Sully Prudhomme, 164

Tolstoi, 90, 169

Vasconcellos, vii
Vuilleumier, 110

Wagner, Charles, 79, 125
Wells, H. G., 57

Xenophon, 144

Zinzendorf, 100

Date Due

2/6/40			
~~12/20~~ 1/9 7/5/46			
MAY 18 1970			
OCT 3 0 1973			

Library Bureau Cat. no. 1137

60607

BR
110
.B783

60607

Bovet, P.
Child's religion.

DATE LOANED	BORROWER'S NAME
4-20-70	Nick Bauvista
5-4	Renew
OCT 16 73	Loan
10-30	Re

DEMCO

P9-BET-429